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INTRODUCTION 
 
 In 1886, Henry W. Grady sat at Delmonico’s restaurant in New York City for the 
annual meeting of the New England Society, featuring a collection of some of the most 
influential and wealthiest politicians, businessmen, and other leaders of the previous 20 
years, including millionaire banker J.P. Morgan and Standard Oil founder H.M. Flagler.  
Grady, the first southerner to address the group in its history, was to follow speeches from 
General William T. Sherman, perhaps the most detested man among whites in Grady’s 
native Georgia, and T. DeWitt Talmage, a well-known northern pastor famous for his 
reformist platform, particularly against slavery.  Here was Grady, Georgia’s favorite son 
and a Democrat, limited in his influence and recognition beyond the southern states, 
following the famous Union war hero who burned much of Grady’s hometown of Atlanta 
to the ground and a celebrated pastor who fought for the end of an institution so enmeshed 
in southern society that it had, to many in the North, defined the South itself.  The two men 
gave their speeches; Talmage spoke first, discussing how what he termed the ‘typical 
American’ of the future would be born of many nationalities, and Sherman followed with a 
toast to the absent President Cleveland.1   
 Grady had prepared nothing, but during the proceedings had scribbled notes on the 
back of a menu.  At last, Grady stood and addressed the crowd, opening with words, he 
claimed, that had been uttered by Georgia Congressman Benjamin H. Hill in 1866: “There 
was a South of slavery and secession—that South is dead.  There is a South of union and 
freedom—that South, thank God, is living, breathing, growing every hour.” With a slight 
                                                 
1 Louis Albert Banks, T. DeWitt Talmage: his life and works: biographical edition (Philadelphia: John C. 
Winston Co., 1902), 188.; Harold E. Davis, Henry Grady's New South: Atlanta, a Brave and Beautiful City 
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2002), 175-8.; “The New South” Speech as reprinted in Barton C. 
Shaw, “Henry Grady Heralds the New South,” Atlanta Historical Journal 30, no. 2 (1986): 58-65. 
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rebuke to Talmage, he said that the typical American had already come; he was Abraham 
Lincoln, a man who was neither northern nor southern but was “greater than the Puritan, 
greater than the Cavalier in that he was American, and that in his honest form were first 
gathered the vast and thrilling forces of his ideal government.”  And like the typical 
American, a New South had also arrived, a South of industriousness, freedom, good 
fortune, and benevolence towards its brothers in the North, all raised from the ruins of the 
Civil War.  He posed a question to his audience, “Now, what answer has New England to 
this message?  Will she permit the prejudice of war to remain in the hearts of the 
conquerors, when it has died in the hearts of the conquered?”  The South, he concluded, 
awaited the North’s friendship. With his closing words, Henry Grady would soon become 
the most prominent, most celebrated voice of the New South movement.  As newspapers 
from across the nation publicized his mantra, he represented a symbol for reconciliation 
and progress known not only in the South but across the entire country.2 
 This is the image that scholars most often associate with Henry Grady, the 
“Spokesman of the New South”: a bold reconciliationist whose New South vision fostered 
renewed economic ties between North and South in calling for northern investment and 
southern industrialization and growth.  Occasionally scholars will also mention Grady’s 
white supremacist feelings, and that his image of a South where whites and blacks lived 
peaceably and thrived contradicted the actuality of a southern society hostile towards 
blacks.  But while elements of these assertions bear truth, the reality of Grady’s New South 
vision proves more complicated.  Scholars prefer to look at his New South program as 
reconciliatory towards North and South, but evidence derived from Grady’s writings and 
speeches throughout the 1870s and 1880s suggests that Grady’s rhetoric is geared not 
                                                 
2 Ibid. 
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towards necessarily a sectional reunion but towards political compromise between 
Republicans and particularly southern Democrats.  Other scholars have argued that 
Grady’s New South vision was a principally economic or racial vision for the future of the 
South.  I assert that, rather, his vision was a political alliance between Republicans and 
Democrats that manifested itself through economic and racial mechanisms; it offered 
economic incentives to Republicans in the North and, in exchange, the freedom to establish 
a social system that created racial separation rooted in white supremacy to southern 
Democrats.   
 The political atmosphere in America during and after Reconstruction created heavy 
tension between whites and blacks, particularly in the black belt region, where slavery had 
been most prevalent and where the slaveholding planter elite held the most political sway.  
In these counties, blacks and their white allies took control over many public offices; with 
few exceptions, this coalition ran Republican.  In competition with them was the southern 
Democratic Party, which drew much of its appeal from racism, and found its greatest 
successes in counties that were majority or near-majority black.  Voter intimidation and 
violence would turn the black, and therefore Republican, voters away from the polls come 
election time, significantly altering voter turnout in favor of the Democrats.  Voter 
intimidation manifested itself in several ways.  Sometimes it meant socially ostracizing 
Republicans, principally white but sometimes black, from the community.  But in the case 
of black Republicans, white southerners resorted to violence and scare tactics, at first 
through the First Ku Klux Klan and later through rifle clubs, after the Klan’s disbandment 
in 1871.  It was through these tactics that southern Democrats sought to maintain their 
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system of white supremacy that the federal government had interrupted with the abolition 
of slavery.3     
 Henry Grady’s New South vision offered an alternative to violence as a weapon of 
racial dominance.  It presented a society that operated peaceably where whites and blacks 
coexisted but were otherwise racially separated; this, he maintained, was the only possible 
way of preserving a mixed race society.  His vision appealed to both Republicans and 
Democrats on several grounds.  To Republicans, it meant that Republican voters would 
cease to be interfered with at the polls, which further indicated diminishing hostility 
towards the party.  Compounding this desire for an end of Republican political oppression 
was the need for new venture capital investment opportunities, for which the South was 
ripe given its changing economy; if the South was truly peaceable, it meant that northern 
labor could operate in the South, and, as a result, northern Republican capitalists would 
possess fewer qualms in investing their cash in the South.  To southern Democrats, the 
vision would convince northern Republicans that the South was compliant and therefore no 
longer needed mandated control from the federal government.  Without Republicans 
maintaining their watchful gaze over the political mechanisms in the South, white 
Democrats possessed free reign to establish their racially separated society and thereby 
assert their supremacy. 
 But though the result of Grady’s New South vision was a political truce, it did not 
speak directly of politics.  Instead it operated through messages of economic prosperity.  
The majority of wealth in the southern slave economy was not invested in land (as a factor 
of production), as it was in the North, but in labor itself.  Therefore, when slavery was 
                                                 
3 J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the establishment of the 
One-Party System, 1880-1910 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 16-17. 
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abolished, so too was much of southerners’ wealth.  Boosters in the South, Grady among 
them, focused on creating an entrepreneurial spirit to recover the South’s lost wealth 
through industrialization.  Central to this industrialization was the need for a network of 
railroads that could haul raw materials, coal principle among them, to the newly 
established factories across the South.  And around the railroads came boomtowns, around 
which more mills were built.4   
 One such railroad town was the city of Atlanta.  Though built in the late-1830s, 
Atlanta embodied the entrepreneurial spirit characteristic of Grady’s New South.  Despite 
Atlanta and its several railroad lines having been utterly destroyed at the hands of the 
Union Army following the Battle of Atlanta in 1864, the city’s citizens managed to quickly 
rebuild Atlanta’s infrastructure and railroads just months after the end of the war. The city 
repopulated rather quickly, so much so that by 1880, the census put the number of 
residents at more than 37,000 individuals, more than quadruple the number of residents 
from before the war.  When Grady moved to Atlanta permanently in 1879, he took 
advantage of the city’s identity as the “Phoenix City,” rebuilt from the ashes of the Civil 
War and moving towards a prosperous future.  In selling his vision to Republicans, he cited 
this as evidence of a changed South that harbored no hatreds and sought only to reap the 
rewards of its labor, in just the same way as northerners worked.5 
 But if some values associated with the South had changed to mirror those of 
northerners, such as those changes undertaken in Atlanta, others remained strong.  Pride in 
an imagining of the South’s past as an aristocratic, noble society dedicated to values such 
                                                 
4 Gavin Wright, Old South, New South: revolutions in the southern economy since the Civil War (New York: 
Basic Books, 1986), 19-21, 39, 43. 
5 Russell S. Bonds, War Like the Thunderbolt: The Battle and Burning of Atlanta (Yardley, PA: Westholme 
Publishing, 2009), 386, 388. 
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as courteousness, leisure, and camaraderie and loyalty between whites and their slaves 
were cornerstones of southern culture.  Grady’s vision echoed these sentiments throughout 
his life; even in his New South speech in New York, he insisted that the South and its past 
had “nothing for which to apologize.”  These were, Grady maintained, part of southern 
white identity and therefore immutable.  Reconciliation would not mean forgetting the 
past, but instead it would mean honoring it and uplifting it through the rhetoric of what 
would become the Lost Cause, a public memory glorifying the antebellum South and the 
Confederacy whose rhetoric revered the fallen soldier and confederates as survivors of a 
noble conflict.  Though Grady never directly referenced the Lost Cause by name, he 
embraced many of its tenets, reinforcing white southern identity to northern Republicans.  
Even in their compromise, Democrats would remember their past.6 
 Though scholars often associate the terms industrialization, boosterism, southern 
identity, and Lost Cause with Grady and his vision, they have understated the political 
implications that drove Grady’s thinking and connected these notions. Harold Davis, 
perhaps the preeminent scholar on Grady, overlooks this connection in favor of narrowly 
attaching Grady’s vision to building Atlanta and Atlanta alone.  Perhaps Grady did hope 
that his vision would propel Atlanta ahead of its rival southern cities, and in many ways 
Atlanta ultimately did.  But to boil down the entirety of Grady’s New South program to the 
“singular local application of the New South elements—farm policy, race, 
industrialization, and reconciliation—each emphasized or distorted in a way to help his 
city,” disregards the far reaching implications of the vision, namely in how it served as a 
transition into the Jim Crow era.  Viewing the vision through the lens of the political 
                                                 
6 Shaw, “Henry Grady Heralds the New South,” 64.; David W. Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in 
American Memory (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001), 38. 
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atmosphere of the 1880s demonstrates that reconciliation was neither clean nor solid.  It 
took years for Democrats and Republicans to comfortably embrace one another, and even 
after Grady’s vision achieved the political alliance between the two parties, it held 
delicately for only two years before it broke down.  Exploring the political relationships of 
the post-Reconstruction era and how Grady’s vision attempted to manage them reveals 
more deeply the deep-seated tensions of an era characterized by northern capitulation.7 
 Historian K. Stephen Prince asserts, “The South was not just a place.  It was an 
idea,” and this is an appropriate starting point to understand Grady and his New South.  
For the South that Grady described to his audiences, both in his speeches and in his 
newspaper articles, was a picture or idea of what he imagined it could ultimately be, but 
not as it actually was.  But there were signs it might come about.  The South of the early 
and mid-1880s offered chances for a society to develop in which whites and blacks 
actually interacted with one another in an open, fair political environment; Grady’s New 
South never called for the disenfranchisement of southern blacks but instead wanted to 
harness the power of the black vote, and in fact the numbers of black voters during the 
decade tallies quite largely given the Democrats’ control of the ballot boxes.  Further still, 
while his vision included a social separation of whites and blacks that bears resemblance to 
Joel Williamson’s theory of a duo-chromatic order, it did not call for the exclusion of 
blacks from society or prosperity altogether in the way that the era formally considered Jim 
Crow did.8  Of course, to submit that Grady’s New South was better than Jim Crow and 
                                                 
7 Davis, Henry Grady's New South, 196. 
8 Joel Williamson, “The Separation of the Races,” found in John David Smith, ed., When Did Southern 
Segregation Begin? (New York: Macmillan, 2002). The theory of a duo-chromatic order suggests that blacks 
and whites in South Carolina each undertook a conscious social separation of the races.  Blacks though 
retained the same privileges as whites to use public spaces until 1889 when the state’s antidiscrimination 
laws were repealed. 
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slavery comparatively says little, but it suggests that, as C. Vann Woodward claims in The 
Strange Career of Jim Crow, the result of southern race relations that came about 
beginning in the 1890s was not set in stone.9  The same forces that helped Jim Crow 
establish its foothold in the American South were the same forces that ultimately pushed 
southern Democrats and Republicans to break the political alliance that was at the core of 
Grady’s New South.10 
 Central to Grady’s vision and to its undoing were memories of the past and the 
identity associated with them.  Historian David Blight identifies three forms of 
remembrance of the Civil War informing thinking on race relations in the late nineteenth 
century.  The supremacists sought to continue emphasizing sectionalist ties and would 
terrorize the black population.  The emancipationists held that the South could never truly 
be reconstructed and reunified until the question of the place of black Americans in a 
liberated South could be addressed.  Finally, the reconciliationists delivered a message of 
mutual grief and suffering from the Civil War, but also looked to the future to rebuild.11  
Blight situates the boosters, including Henry Grady, with the reconciliationists, and Grady 
certainly was a forward-looking reconciliationist; Blight further notes that 
reconciliationists and supremacists banded together in many of their pursuits, which also 
holds in terms of Grady.  This is the way we remember Grady and his New South vision, 
but is that enough to understand an incredibly complicated political truce that was built 
upon decades of history, ideas, and expectations of the South, and then helped set it on the 
course that would define it for the next sixty years and beyond?  In this thesis, I seek to 
                                                 
9 C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, found in John David Smith, ed., When Did Southern 
Segregation Begin? (New York: Macmillan, 2002). 
10 K. Stephen Prince, Stories of the South: The cultural retreat from Reconstruction (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2010), 2.; Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics, 27-29. 
11 Blight, Race and Reunion, 2. 
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reexamine the common narrative of Grady and his New South vision and tackle the 
political nuances imbued in it. It asks three questions: what political, social, and racial 
influences drove Grady’s New South vision?  How did his vision help create the political 
truce between Democrats and Republicans?  And what is the relationship between his 
vision and the early development of Jim Crow?   
 I have drawn my primary sources principally from newspaper articles and editorials 
and speeches.  Grady wrote or delivered most of these works, but other utilized sources 
include articles written by staff reporters at Grady’s newspaper, the Atlanta Constitution 
(where reporters operated under the direction and approval of Grady as managing editor), 
editorials from critics of other newspapers and magazines from across the nation, and 
speeches and interviews from several prominent politicians and businessmen, including 
Senator Joseph Brown and businessman Edward Atkinson.  These sources span throughout 
Grady’s professional career, from 1870 until his death in 1889, charting his views from 
when he worked for small-town papers in Georgia to his time with major regional and 
national newspapers, including the Constitution and the New York Herald.  Grady spread 
his message through the press and on the public speaking circuit, and critics responded to 
that message through their own presses and media outlets.  And in addition to influencing 
public opinion, presses concurrently reflected and strengthened that opinion, particularly in 
the South.  Therefore, these articles and speeches offer an appropriate gauge of the 
relationship between Grady and the public as he delivered his New South vision.12   
 This thesis is organized into three chapters.  The first chapter considers the factors 
early in Grady’s life that influenced his later vision of a New South.  I assert that the 
                                                 
12 Richard H. Abbot, For Free Press and Equal Rights: Republican Newspapers in the Reconstruction South 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2004), 1. 
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concepts that ultimately formed his New South vision arose from a deeply held retention of 
the idea of southern identity.  Grady was raised in a college town indicative of a classic 
Old South environment, in a family that owned slaves.  Further his father served and died 
for the Confederate cause.  Though he may not have known the phrase throughout his life, 
Grady’s childhood invoked in him sentimentality for the South that resembled the very 
same romanticizing of the Lost Cause.  This fondness for the past and for white 
supremacy, coupled with the postwar industrial spirit embodied by his eventual home, 
Atlanta, and his skill as a Democratic journalist and editor, provided him with the tools to 
fulfill his vision. 
 The second chapter explores the process by which Grady built his reputation as a 
Democrat and also as a moderate reformer, friendly to Republicans.  Grady’s New South 
was meant to suggest that the South had changed from its antebellum days into a society 
more reflective of the North.  Using Atlanta to showcase the possible improvements, the 
International Cotton Exposition of 1881 was intended to transform northerners’ 
preconceived notions about the South.  After northerners showed their interest in investing 
in the South, Grady quelled any lingering doubts about the South at the New England 
Society, playing upon the mutual respect for fallen soldiers and heroes of old to in turn 
express the brotherhood between regions that was yet untapped.  Although he tried to 
depict a southern region wholly united behind his vision, Grady’s New South was not 
universally accepted, and it left on the margins several populations, principally the farmers 
of the South, fueling an emerging Populist movement, and southern blacks. 
 The third chapter considers the political and racial undertones of Grady’s vision, 
how it highlighted the white supremacy inherent in southern white identity and the 
11  
southern Democratic Party.  From his earliest reporting days, Grady expressed a close 
relationship with the southern Democratic Party in his anti-Republican and anti-
Reconstruction rhetoric, as well as his subtle white supremacist attitudes.  Once 
northerners had been convinced of the South’s changed ways, Grady wrote more openly of 
the need for a racially separated society.  With this racially charged rhetoric, he helped to 
reinforce white supremacy as a distinctly southern identity, which sometimes led to violent 
results, including a rise in lynching and massacre of southern blacks as the 1880s 
progressed.  Northerners did not rebuke this attitude and identity as long as it meant 
Republican voters would not be tampered with and as long as the South remained a 
profitable business venture.  But as the 1880s began to close, southern Democrats began to 
more openly harass and intimidate black voters as formal segregation began to take root; 
Republicans responded with frustration over the antagonism directed towards Republican 
voters, marking their eroding political power in the region.  After Grady died just days 
after he gave his final speech in December 1889, in which he made the same claims of 
racial separation but offered no solutions to violence, his imagined New South was all but 
dead.  And the forces that unraveled and killed the alliance set the South on a road of ruin: 
white southern Democrats had begun to embrace violence towards blacks, lawfully 
separating and disenfranchising them, which signaled the arrival of a Jim Crow racial 
system.  
 The story of Henry Grady’s New South is ultimately the story of a compromise 
between two political parties—each with racial and sectional preferences.  And it is in 
understanding its formation and ultimately its failure that we see a more complicated 
12  
picture of Grady and his New South, offering new insights into this transitional period in 
southern American history between Reconstruction and Jim Crow.
13 
CHAPTER ONE:  Origins of a Vision for a New South 
 
 Henry Grady could not hold his tongue.  Reporting from Washington D.C. on 
February 21, 1877, he wrote, “The fight against fraud has about broken down and Hayes 
will regularly and peacefully be inaugurated—the first usurper of the republic.”1 The 
election of 1876 was highly disputed, with the popular vote favoring Democratic candidate 
Samuel Tilden, and electoral votes putting Tilden one vote shy of a majority in the 
Electoral College.  But it was Hayes who was named the apparent winner of the election.  
The Democrats claimed federal troops in Louisiana, South Carolina, and Florida had 
tampered with the polls to give Hayes a victory; Republicans responded that Democrats 
had kept black Republican voters from the polls.  As tension mounted and both parties 
threatened violence, Congress formed a bipartisan commission of five senators, five 
representatives, and five Supreme Court justices to determine the election; the commission 
ruled 8-7 in favor of Hayes.  After months of arguing and negotiating on the commission, a 
compromise had been reached: in exchange for Hayes’s seat in the White House, federal 
troops would be pulled from the South.  This Compromise of 1877 marked the end of 
Reconstruction.2 
 Though the Compromise involved both parties and though it ended what many 
former Confederate sympathizers viewed as an era of oppression from Radical 
Republicans, many Democrats, particularly southern Democrats, including Grady, viewed 
the Compromise as corrupt.  They believed that they had been cheated. For Grady and 
many southern Democrats, Hayes’s ascension to the White House recalled years of tyranny 
from a fraudulent Republican government, this time aided by the northern Democrats and 
                                                 
1 Henry W. Grady, “Haggling with Hayes,” Constitution, February 21, 1877. 
2 “Disputed Election of 1876,” Rutherford B. Hayes Presidential Center, accessed January 29, 2016. 
http://www.rbhayes.org/hayes/president/display.asp?id=511. 
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their “mock heroic[s].”  “During the whole of this campaign,” Grady said, “[the South] 
contentedly held a back seat…” only to be betrayed by the North.3   
 Such was the predominant sentiment in the South, a sentiment that could be traced 
back to the country’s post-Revolutionary days.  In the formation of the unifying narrative 
of the United States, many white southern leaders believed that their interests had been 
ignored or threatened.  Ideas about America as a whole revolved around principally 
northern perceptions and pursuits: industry, business, and, most importantly, the movement 
towards, and in some cases achievement of, the end of slavery.  In response to being 
“othered out” of the national narrative, many white southerners created over time an 
identity distinctly “southern” in nature that they could embrace.  That narrative 
foregrounded the North and South as culturally distinctive.4   
 The perpetuation of that cultural rift forced many leaders, northern and southern 
alike, to reexamine the role of the South in America, especially in light of the Compromise 
of 1877.  The predominant ideas of the antebellum South had apparently died with the 
abolition of slavery, and so it was necessary to ask what was the South and, more 
importantly, what would it become?  The end of Reconstruction marked the end of 
Republicans’ efforts to shape the region and its values into the image of the North.5  But 
with the departure of Republicans, white southern leaders intensified their efforts to rebuild 
and redefine the South.  For many white leaders, their vision of the South was instilled in 
their past: their values of nobility, honor, and leisure in their Christian, white antebellum 
                                                 
3 Grady, “Haggling with Hayes.”  
4 James C. Cobb, Away Down South: A History of Southern Identity (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 5. 
5 But though active efforts had ceased, this idea of what would later be coined the No South, referring to a 
lack of apparent cultural, political, and economic distinction between North and South, endured in 
Republican thought.   
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society.  But some leaders recognized that to simply recreate the Old South would be ill 
advised, lest the mistakes of the past be repeated; for them, there would need to be a New 
South onto which white southerners could latch that offered both progress and the values 
of old.  For Grady, that meant transforming the South from an agrarian society to a more 
industrial, modernized region that still embraced the spirit and culture of the Old South.6 
 Henry Grady, born in 1850 and raised in a decorous southern environment, and 
having lived in a fairly large home with several slaves, could easily recognize this Old 
South identity and culture in his family and in himself. Part of this identity was a fondness 
for the past and an honoring of the heroes of the Civil War.  These two precepts were 
incorporated into what would become the “Lost Cause” ideology that formed in the 
decades following the Confederate defeat in the Civil War.  Grady, as a son of the Old 
South, would have regularly heard as a child rhetoric and philosophy that bore a striking 
resemblance to the eventual Lost Cause narrative.  This rhetoric would speak of an 
aristocratic South that valued its leisure and hospitality, of white benevolence towards 
slaves, and of slaves’ undying loyalty to their masters.  These notions of a distinctly 
southern identity would come to define Grady’s New South vision.7 
 And that vision would be personified in Grady’s eventual hometown of Atlanta. 
Though Atlanta was not an agrarian town but a railroad terminal, the townspeople 
embraced values that matched those of the typical southern agrarian society: hard work, 
independence, diligence, and, following the burning of Atlanta in 1864, scars from the 
Civil War.  This city, with its battle-tested history and subsequent economic revival, 
embodied what Grady would stress with his New South vision, at its most basic, in 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 4-7. 
7 Ibid. 7. 
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convincing northerners of the reformed southern experience: with his audiences, he would 
remember the past and then boast of the drive to build for the future.   
 This chapter demonstrates that Grady’s ideas about the future of the South were 
rooted in his perceptions of both his own past and of the past of the South as a whole. 
Grady’s own upbringing in wealthy, isolated Athens, Georgia resembled that of a classic 
Old South childhood: his household owned slaves and many of his town upheld values of 
leisure and culture.  Meanwhile, the city of Atlanta, where Grady resided as an adult, 
exemplified the spirit of a resilient South that honored its past but looked to the future.  
These formative influences combined with the long-held perceptions of the South both 
before and after the Civil War created a sense of white southern identity with which Grady 
clearly grew up and later presented through his New South vision.  By the time Grady 
permanently resided in Atlanta in 1879 and had part-ownership of an influential, stable 
newspaper, the journalist had a platform rooted in the economic enterprises for an 
industrialized South represented by Atlanta, in the fondness for the past that was his own 
childhood, and in the lens through which one could reinterpret and envision a glorious 
southern past and spur the fight for a Democratic, white South with the Lost Cause.  
  
The Atlanta Spirit 
 Sixty miles south of Grady’s hometown of Athens, Georgia stood the city of 
Atlanta, founded in the late 1830’s as the terminal stop of the Western and Atlantic 
railroad.  Located squarely in the hilly Piedmont region of Georgia, Atlanta offered little 
space for farming.  And, unlike Chattanooga to the North, which was near major coal 
deposits, Atlanta’s location was far from any obvious geological or natural resource 
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advantages. Further still, the Chattahoochee River that ran near the city could not support a 
mass port, like Savannah to the east.  In all, Atlanta seemed to present too little of anything 
to maintain much beyond “one tavern, a blacksmith shop, a grocery store, and nothing 
else.”8   
 But the city did have a railroad that would serve as the iron lifeblood by which the 
city would prosper.  While in 1845 only twelve to fourteen families inhabited it, the city 
grew throughout the next decade with the addition of three more railroad lines: the Georgia 
Railroad, the Macon & Western Railroad, and the Atlanta & West Point Railroad. At the 
start of the Civil War, railroad lines from Montgomery, Alabama to the west, Chattanooga, 
Tennessee to the north, and Augusta, Georgia to the south all converged at Atlanta.9  
 From the railroads came opportunities for commercial investment. The four 
railroads served as large employers, and around the terminus sprouted commercial and 
municipal centers: general stores, hotels, churches, a city hall, a jail, and the first 
successful newspaper, the Daily Intelligencer.  Farmers located outside the city further 
stimulated commerce and growth by bringing in their produce for trade and shipment by 
railroad.10  In 1852, the first “machine shop” was founded to repair railroad cars and tracks.  
By the end of the decade, four machine shops in total would flourish, as would two planing 
mills, a rolling mill, and several smaller manufactories.11  The mere twelve-to-fourteen 
families that occupied the city only fifteen years later had increased to more than 6,000 
inhabitants.12   
                                                 
8 Wendy Hamand Venet, A Changing Wind: Commerce and Conflict in Civil War Atlanta (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2014), 5. 
9 Ibid. 
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 As the businessmen poured in, a pattern of governance between them began to take 
shape.  The various business leaders took turns running for and winning public office on 
the city council and the mayor’s office.  Having seen firsthand the capabilities of a 
railroad-based economy, the men shared a common vision of economic prosperity based 
on the continued success of the railroad and the manufacturing shops and mills that 
supported it. They emphasized the growth of business, the improvement and stabilization 
of the city’s infrastructure, and the promotion of the still fledgling city in the state of 
Georgia as a whole, the same basic framework that Henry Grady would publicize in his 
New South vision.  This economic and industrial spirit remained steadfast, and the city 
continued to grow.  By 1859, inhabitants began calling Atlanta the Gate City of the South.  
Even as the Civil War loomed, spirits remained high.13   
 Though Atlanta did not participate in the actual farming of cotton, slaves still 
occupied the city.  Whatever thoughts of secession were before the election of Abraham 
Lincoln, when Georgia became the fifth state to secede from the Union, citizens rallied 
behind the Confederate cause.  The pronouncement of war stifled the burgeoning business 
sector, as resources had to be pumped into new outlets that would benefit not Atlanta itself 
but the war fronts.14  Atlanta became a military post in 1862, its location vital as railroad 
hub of the South.  It continued to produce metal works to support the railroad and the 
Confederate army. But the city is most famous for the months-long Battle of Atlanta that 
preceded General William T. Sherman’s March to the Sea.15 
 After the long siege, the Union army stood victorious.  Desiring to advance east, 
Sherman could not spare troops to remain in the city to defend against a recovered 
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Confederate army.  Recognizing the obvious importance and utility of the railroad, 
Sherman instead resolved to reduce the town into a useless remnant of itself.  “I want you 
to take special charge of the destruction in Atlanta of all depots, car-houses, shops, 
factories, foundries…” Sherman ordered chief engineer Captain Orland M. Poe on 
November 7, 1864, mentioning, “Fire will do most of the work.”16  After having ordered 
the evacuation of every citizen from the city, Sherman set loose the Union army to 
dismantle the city and its railroad lines, leaving a trail of smolder and ash and twisted, 
decrepit metal in its wake.  The light from the fires illuminated the night sky, “Such clouds 
of smoke, and vast sheets of flame, moral eye has seldom seen, the whole region for miles 
was lighted up with strange and indescribable glare,” wrote one Union soldier.17  While 
estimates of the destruction are unclear, and though the whole incident has taken on a 
mythic grandiosity and cruelty to it, it is clear that the city suffered incredible damage.  
One Indiana soldier wrote in his journal, “We have utterly destroyed Atlanta.”18 
 Following the demolition, Georgia militia colonel W.P. Howard surveyed the 
aftermath, noting that only 400 houses remained standing in the city and between 3,200 
and 5,000 had been burned.  The factories, rolling mills, arsenals, armory, foundries, and 
all railroad related buildings and machines had been reduced to scraps.  “Every species of 
machinery that was not destroyed by fire was most ingeniously broken and made worthless 
in its original form—the large steam boilers, the switches, the frogs, etc. Nothing has 
escaped,” Howard wrote.19  And the railroad tracks, the primary support of the city, 
themselves had “simply ceased to be.” But the state and the railroad companies mounted 
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an extraordinary effort to repair the city and the railroads.  In March 1865, though there 
was neither platform nor station, the first railroad reopened and a train drove through the 
city, a remarkable feat when one considers the incredible extent of the damage a mere four 
months prior.20  Rather quickly, an air of normalcy began to resurface.  Fifteen years later, 
the 1880 census would put the total tally of Atlanta inhabitants at more than 37,000.  
Atlanta would adopt the name “Phoenix City” to mark its improbable rebirth.21 
   For any Georgian moving into the city in the 1870s, as Grady did, the story of 
Atlanta’s burning and rebirth would have been a familiar one.  Damage from and recovery 
after the Civil War offered southerners in general, but particularly the citizens of Atlanta, a 
self-starter and communal identity that they embraced, and in doing so shaped their 
remembrances and personal identifications with the Civil War as a whole; for though they 
had lost and had suffered much, they had rebuilt their lives and reshaped their city into a 
bigger and better version of its antebellum iteration.  Southerners could view themselves as 
victims of the hellfire of the Union army, and noble for picking up the pieces to build 
something more beautiful.  It was this identity centered around a noble cause and an 
unyielding embrace of perceptions of what it meant to be “southern,” especially in the face 
of defeat, that ultimately shaped the prevailing sentiment of much of the white South as a 
whole, that of the Lost Cause.  
 
The Rise of the Lost Cause  
 As victors of the Civil War, northerners won the opportunity to reshape the South 
as they saw fit, and what better mold than the image of the North itself?  The 
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Reconstruction process, as historian K. Stephen Prince writes, centered namely on 
answering this core question of “What is the South?”  In searching for an answer, the 
leaders of Reconstruction had to address the antebellum past—what key social and cultural 
structures differentiated it from the industrial-based economic and social system of the 
North.  The answer, of course, was rooted in slavery.22  Northerners had long held notions 
that the South possessed a backward impression of freedom and labor, namely that to be 
free “consists in having somebody else to work for you,” wrote the Chicago Tribune 
during Reconstruction.23  The northerners viewed the South as something completely 
separate, something that needed to be fixed, both physically in its infrastructure and 
ideologically in its perceptions of work, freedom, and culture in general.  In doing so, the 
newly reunified country could move past the bloodshed of the war and into a brighter 
future. 
 The North’s perception of this “otherness” of the South was not birthed out of the 
Civil War.  These cultural perceptions of North and South had persisted in prior decades.  
From 1800 to 1860, the proportion of the northern labor force involved in agriculture 
dropped significantly, from 70% to 40%, while the southern agricultural force remained 
strong, employing 80% of the labor force throughout those six decades.  The fact was the 
South was entrenched in a deeply different economic system than the North, and the 
cultural, economic, and political implications of that system mandated that cotton be 
grown to own more slaves to grow more cotton, and the cycle continued.24  The obvious 
distinction between the two regions would have proved less substantial had the 
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construction of the American identity not been centered completely on the northern way of 
life.  As historian James C. Cobb wrote, “From the outset [of post-Revolutionary 
America], a widely dispersed, overwhelmingly rural population and the absence of 
incentives in a plantation-based society for the investments in public education needed to 
develop significant literary or journalistic institutions had effectively consigned the 
southern states on the periphery of popular communication in America.”25  In essence, the 
South had been “othered out” of the national narrative.26  
 The natural response to the apparent lack of identity was to embrace the one 
northerners refused to acknowledge.  To be southern was not just a point of pride but an 
appeal to the original American way of life, the very agrarian lifestyle that Thomas 
Jefferson envisioned.  An unavoidable component of that way of life was slavery and white 
superiority, and so the South became only more entrenched in the cultural disparities 
between North and South.27     
 When the Civil War ended, northerners could reason that their victory proved the 
social, economic, and moral superiority of their way of life.  Leaders in the South, by 
contrast, could only assume that defeat meant not only the dismantling of their own 
lifestyle and culture, one that had persisted since America’s colonial days, but also the 
further erasure of a southern identity from the national narrative—and the defeat after a 
bloody Civil War would only solidify that fact in the annals of history.28  Rather than 
capitulate to the erasure from history and wallow in defeat, the South began to concoct a 
new way of thinking.   
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 In 1866, Virginia journalist and Confederate sympathizer Edward A. Pollard 
released his book, The Lost Cause, putting to phrase the new, growing southern spirit.  The 
Lost Cause offered not only solace in the shadow of defeat but also a sort of moral victory 
that the South could embrace.  The South did not choose slavery, Lost Cause moralizers 
would argue; it was thrust upon them by the British and the northern merchants and slave 
traders that would profit from the transactions of slaves and raw materials.  Further, the 
South had gone to war not for slavery itself but for the protection of Constitutional 
freedoms of state rights guaranteed in the Tenth Amendment.  That the Confederacy had 
seceded from the Union not dissimilarly from the manner in which the thirteen colonies 
had left Britain provided further justification.29  From this revisionist frame of mind came a 
new sentimentalism for the southern past, the days of the righteous, noble, Christian 
Cavalier.  Embodied by the likes of Robert E. Lee, the Confederate soldier became a 
Christian warrior who upheld the values of the past, who fought the Yankee just as the 
Pope’s soldiers gallivanted to Jerusalem in the Crusades. God had preordained that the 
South had lost in its moral cause because, as the Episcopal bishop of Georgia Stephen 
Elliot contended, “God’s people must always be tried.”30   
 As Union soldiers occupied the southern states to implement Reconstruction, the 
Lost Cause took on a more belligerent aura.  The South had battles to fight yet—not battles 
of war, though Pollard did not disregard the possibility of another Civil War, but one of 
ideologies. In the introduction of his 1868 follow-up book, The Lost Cause Regained, 
Pollard asserted, “That the question of the Negro practically couples or associates a 
revolutionary design upon the Constitution; and that the true question which the war 
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involved…was the supremacy of the white race, and along with it the preservation of the 
political traditions of the country.”31  By occupying the southern states and implementing 
their Reconstruction agenda, northerners and Radical Republicans continued to oppress the 
basic rights on which the Union was founded, and necessarily included in those rights was 
the supremacy of whites over blacks.  This was the new front of the war: “From the 
beginning, Lost Cause diehards attacked Reconstructionist policy nearly as much as they 
appealed for history true to the Confederate cause.”32  By establishing alliances with 
northern whites sympathetic to Anglo superiority, the Democratic Party could overthrow 
the Republicans and claim the symbolic victory for which the Civil War had truly been 
fought.33 
 But for as much as political rallying could do for a wounded southern ego, and 
though, as Cobb argues, Reconstruction would fall as a result of “Lost Cause propaganda 
and Pollard’s political plan,” the realities of a collapsed southern economy weighed 
heavily on the common man.34   Wealth in the North had increased by 50 percent in the 
1860s, while southern wealth had spiraled.  In an economy heavily invested in labor itself 
rather than land, emancipation meant the loss of an estimated $3 to $4 billion, in addition 
to damages incurred during the war.  With global demand for cotton beginning to stagnate, 
the need for a new economic system that altered the plantation system to one of free labor, 
and in the process take advantage of that copious, newly available free labor, became 
urgent.35  The rapid rebuilding and expansion of the railroads would prove indispensible to 
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any sort of future success.  Through railroads, towns could self-build, much in the same 
way Atlanta did in the antebellum era.  Towns spread word through the mail with 
pamphlets advertising their local cotton and real estate markets.  “The ‘booster’ 
spirit…was a reflection of the basic economic impulses behind town building itself, the 
tendency of townspeople to treat their communities as a common enterprise.”36   
 This southern culture persisted, engrained within it an undying sentimentalism for 
an idealized past, one where to be southern meant to be proud, self-sustaining, and 
American in the Jeffersonian sense, and one that had known tensions but had not known 
civil war.  When, following the election of 1876, the Republicans struck a deal with the 
Democrats to secure the presidency for Rutherford B. Hayes in exchange for the removal 
of federal troops from South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana, effectively ending 
Republican-controlled governance, Reconstruction came to an end.  Permeated by the Lost 
Cause, the new, shared history of the “Old South” united white southerners in a common 
experience, and laid the groundwork for a new front to reassert the glory of the past.37  
This “New South” would play upon the same constraints as the Lost Cause, but adapt it to 
a northern audience, effectively making the Lost Cause not a southern experience but a 
national one.  But a strong and sure voice would need to handle such a delicate matter; that 
voice belonged to a young journalist from Georgia named Henry Grady. 
 
Growing Up in Athens, GA38 
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 In 1850, the year of Grady’s birth, the small town of Athens, roughly sixty miles 
northeast of Atlanta, had a population of 3,500, approximately divided evenly between 
whites and slaves. A trading center for the plantations around it, Athens was also the home 
to the University of Georgia and three small cotton factories.  But life in Athens revolved 
around the genteel and the intellectual, its free inhabitants sought not for their town to 
industrialize but to remain the leisurely, idyllic town of large, white-columned houses and 
vast fields of green.39  Grady’s father, William, was not a planter but owned and operated a 
plant to supply Athens with gas from converted pinewood.  As the business found success, 
William moved his family from the small cottage in which Grady was born into a two-
story house within eyeshot of the university.  The Gradys owned five slaves as house 
servants, who, as Grady biographer Nixon writes, “under the customs of the pre-war South 
enjoyed a status somewhat above that of the ordinary field hand.”  Nixon suggests Grady 
was welcoming and cordial with these servants, even lovingly playing with a young slave 
whom he referred to as “Brother Isaac.”40  
 Though William Grady did not initially support secession, voting for moderate 
Democrats in the 1860 election, he nonetheless joined the Confederate cause following the 
events at Fort Sumter, convinced that states had a constitutional right to secede.  William 
self-funded a company of guards and became a captain in the Twenty-fifth North Carolina 
Regiment.  Accompanying Captain Grady were two family slaves.41  
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 Though the war had forced the schooling system to shut down, it did not stop 
young Henry from finding ways to learn.  At the now-closed university, where a 
Confederate hospital and a small Union prison camp now stood, Grady would often speak 
with soldiers from both sides, gaining their insights, and sharing his leftover morsels of 
food or cash he might have on him.  Though much of Georgia would suffer the physical 
devastation of war, from Sherman’s March and other skirmishes, Athens remained 
physically untouched.42   
 But vigilance was nonetheless necessary without Captain Grady to protect the 
family.  Grady would recall the faithfulness of the slaves that remained with his family in 
his father’s absence.  He wrote of one “trusty slave, who for four years while my father 
fought with the armies that barred his freedom, slept every night at my mother’s chamber 
door, holding her and her children as safe as if her husband stood guard.”43   
 Though the buildings of Athens themselves suffered little during the war, at war’s 
end, its citizens felt the brunt of a demoralizing defeat.  Many of Athens’ citizen-soldiers 
had died in campaign, and much of the remaining citizens’ wealth was lost to fund the war.  
Union troops occupied the university and the Georgia state treasury lacked funds to finance 
it, ensuring it would not reopen for some time.44 And Grady had suffered the compound 
tragedy of the death of his father in October 1864 and of his baby brother earlier that 
year.45 
 These remembrances of Grady’s early life and the idyllic portrait of growing up in 
a classically “Old South” town suggest a strong link to Grady’s frame of mind with which 
                                                 
42 Ibid. 40. 
43 Ibid. 39. 
44 Ibid. 41. 
45 Ibid. 40. 
28  
he would ultimately write about and discuss the South.  One cannot help but question if the 
descriptions of Grady’s growing up are accurate, as relayed by Grady and his various, 
posthumous biographies, or if these memories had been influenced by an infatuation with 
the Old South ideal.  The fact remains that we can never know exactly how Grady lived.  
But one cannot ignore the stark parallels between Grady’s remembrances and the Lost 
Cause/Old South ideology that appeared following the end of the war.  The sentimentalism 
with which he regarded his past is perhaps best demonstrated in Grady’s review of a stage 
production of “Uncle Tom’s Cabin,” written in January, 1881.  Grady’s disdain for the 
“unfair” and “false” portrayals in the play is clear, and he reminded readers, “There was no 
hint on the stage of the real antebellum life of the South…No touch of that strange 
tenderness that bound the old slave to his old ‘massa’ and ‘missus,’ in a bondage softer and 
yet stronger than slavery.”46   
 Grady grew up in an environment already infatuated with the genteel South, the 
same idea that would also serve as the cornerstone of the Lost Cause.  That Grady had 
lived comfortably, in a larger house with slaves as servants, and suffered the loss of a 
father would only compound the fondness with which he would look back on the 
antebellum years.  Whether he had known of the Lost Cause by name when he began his 
career in journalism in the early 1870s is a moot point—he already lived the life the Lost 
Cause would later lay out for southerners to affectionately remember.  And it was through 
journalism that such rhetoric could spread throughout society. 
 
Early Journalism Career in the Reconstruction Era 
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 Newspapers had long affiliated with political parties, working in tandem to spread 
the party platform and denounce critics.  By 1860, the South was so enmeshed with the 
Democratic Party that no Republican newspaper existed in the eventual Confederate states.  
But with the outset of the Civil War, the Republican Party saw an opportunity to spread its 
message.  It established a series of newspapers throughout the South to begin to 
disseminate information targeting Unionists in the seceded states with the hopes of 
converting them to the Republican Party.47  Following the war, these Unionist papers, such 
as the Virginia State Journal and the Savannah Daily, numbered at least twenty-seven and 
existed in nine of the eleven Confederate states.  When the war ended, the Unionist papers 
converted to purely Republican presses and took to altering public opinion.48  
 Of course, anti-Republican papers still remained.  The southern newspaper business 
had suffered during wartime, as many publishers, printers, editors, etc. had left the 
business to join the Confederate army.  Those papers that remained active found difficulty 
in acquiring printing materials due to the Union blockade, and the Union army often 
destroyed printing materials and machinery when it occupied a town or city.  But following 
the war, the southern presses had rebuilt themselves, having actually increased their 
numbers since before the war by 1870, and fueled themselves with their ire for the 
Republican platform and Reconstruction.49 
 The newspaper always held a larger sway over southern readers than over northern 
ones.  As a planter and agriculture-based socioeconomic system, the South possessed few 
incentives for schooling, libraries, and other readily available sources of information and 
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education that were more abundant in the North.  Therefore, a town’s local paper might be 
the only, or at least the principal, accessible source.  The exact degree of a newspaper’s 
influence cannot be easily measured, but like town leaders, clergymen, and public officials, 
a newspaper and its editor certainly held a certain sway, especially in smaller, more rural 
parts of the South.50 
 Southern, anti-Republican newspapers far outnumbered their Republican 
counterparts, and created and persisted a culture of “intolerance of divergent opinion and 
dissent.”51  The anti-Republican, anti-Reconstruction newspapers remained highly united 
on this front, generally refusing to acknowledge newspapers that countered their opinions, 
sometimes referring to them as “nigger papers” that printed only “incendiary 
documents.”52  The southern Democratic public aided in the maltreatment of the 
Republican press by refusing to make purchases from businesses that took up ad space in 
these newspapers or by otherwise socially ostracizing the owners.53  The meshing of the 
political with the social and economic may have been troubling to the Republican 
transplants, but it aided the anti-Republican public in remaining steadfast in their zealotry, 
and demonstrated to Democratic leaders that their Lost Cause platform was working; there 
was, after all, a narrative to uphold. 
 Henry Grady was ready to participate in the anti-Republican sentiment of the day.  
Beginning as a reporter for the Atlanta Constitution in 1868, he made his name known 
through his wit and vivid descriptions in his news stories.  In 1869 he became associate 
editor of the weekly Rome Courier. Grady quickly took to making his position with the 
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Democrats known.  In his first issue as editor, Grady immediately attacked Georgia’s 
governor, Rufus B. Bullock.  A northern-born businessman that worked with the 
Confederacy, Bullock ran as a Republican for governor in 1868, defeating the favorite 
John B. Gordon.  Grady decried the Governor, asserting that, “We [of the Courier] have 
never, in the whole course of our life, seen a man who was gifted with so great an amount 
of beguiling blarney as is this man.”54  Bullock had been the subject of criticisms since his 
election, accused of bribery and corruption, particularly regarding the state-owned Western 
& Atlantic Railroad, for his personal profit at the expense of the state.55  “We do not fear 
the couth ruffian, that is with hideous leer torted, but the soft and supple gentleman 
scoundrel, that ‘can smile and smile, play the villain still,’” wrote Grady.56  And when the 
Atlanta-based Intelligencer rushed to the governor’s aid, Grady retorted with a 
condemnation of the paper, claiming it had, “deserted the cause in which it has so long 
battled, and is no longer worthy the confidence of Democratic leaders.”57  The truth of the 
accusations against Bullock and his character is irrelevant.  And in fact he managed to 
bring in considerable northern capital, as Grady would call for a mere decade later, to build 
railroads, schools, and public buildings.  Nonetheless, the largely white, Democratic public 
believed him a Republican lapdog and a menace to Georgia.  Bullock resigned the office in 
secret after the 1870 election brought a Democratic majority to the state legislature.58 
 Through the 1870s, Grady started and joined various other newspapers, including 
the Atlanta Sunday-Telegram and the Atlanta Herald before becoming managing editor 
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and part owner of the Atlanta Constitution in 1879.  During the decade, Grady continued 
his role as Democratic watchdog.  He campaigned vigorously for the 1876 election of 
Alfred H. Colquitt to the governorship.  His election, Grady asserted, would mark the end 
of “noisiness and demagoguism” in Georgia, and that Colquitt was a “calm and tranquil 
patriot—this simple, decorous gentleman, who never knew a politicians trick, who could 
not descend to a demagogue’s shift.”59   
 No doubt Grady used the word “demagoguism” in reference to Governor Bullock 
and the Radical Republicans.  He vehemently stressed the prejudice of the North towards 
the South, “I am very much afraid that the same generation of Northern men who fought 
the late war, or saw it fought, will never allow the ‘rebels’ or any party friendly to the 
‘rebels’ to regain power.”  The South remained the victim of northern aggression and a 
Republican Party that had become “rotten” and “debauched.”  The oppression of the South 
by the Republican North harkened back to the Lost Cause narrative, but Grady used it in a 
more subtle fashion.  The original intent of the Lost Cause involved the permanent 
ascension of whites over blacks, and in overcoming the Republicans, white southerners 
would achieve the goal of the Civil War.  But Grady made no reference to Anglo 
superiority here or in most of his early politically charged editorials and columns.  In these 
articles, he viewed defeat of the North as a purely political and moral battle with no racial 
overtones.  Here the Lost Cause narrative remained intact but focused on purely sectional 
prejudices and disagreements.  This narrative was more restrained and could be digested by 
northerners.  The failure of Reconstruction and the corruption of the Republican Party, 
particularly after the Belknap Trader Post Scandal of 1876, became acknowledged even 
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within the party itself by the election of 1876. 60  Grady’s calls for reasonableness and 
leniency and an end to Republican corruption would not appear irrational given the 
blatancy of the issue.61    
 Whether Grady actively engaged the Lost Cause or simply happened to brush with 
it is uncertain.  But it is clear that even if he had never heard or read the term “Lost Cause,” 
given his upbringing and the widespread influence of Lost Cause leaders through the 
utilization of Democratic newspapers to spread their gospel, Grady would be familiar with 
its most basic tenets.  Firmly rooted in Atlanta by the mid-1870s, Grady had before him a 
public generally united in their beliefs regarding both the past and the future of their city 
and an untapped economy.  He had an ally in now-Governor Colquitt, and in 1879 he had a 
vastly influential newspaper, one whose readership extended above the Mason-Dixon line.  
All of the pieces were in place when Grady started pushing his New South vision, a 
program that combined Lost Cause sentimentalism and fervor with the more restrained 
rhetoric that Grady had begun to use in 1876.    
 Connecting these many threads was the central question of what a post-slavery 
South might be.  For Grady, it was clear by 1877 that, whatever form it would take, it 
would be in part based on a Lost Cause narrative.  Atlanta, as a symbol of southern rebirth, 
would also play a role in answering that question.  With his position as managing editor of 
a newspaper secure, Grady could channel his voice into calls for reforming the South 
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through economic revitalization.  This would, he hoped, lead to some form of 
reconciliation.  
35 
CHAPTER TWO: The Political Alliance of Henry Grady’s New South 
 
 “We are not fighting prejudice, but a sincere fear,” wrote Henry Grady in 1876.  
President Grant’s administration, in its final year, had been accused of yet another scandal.  
In 1872, Grant’s Secretary of War, William Belknap, was accused of accepting bribes from 
merchants in exchange for preferential access to trading posts in India.  Though the then-
Republican House quashed these allegations, the Democratic majority, secured in 1874, 
reopened the claims, and found that Belknap’s wife continued to receive cash payments 
from merchants.  To Grady, it was the final straw; the Republican Party was “rotten to the 
very core.  Its long lease of power has debauched it.  Its heads of department have become 
corrupt and its minutest machinery corrupt…It has played its part and now lags 
superfluous.  It should step to the rear and give way to a new party.”  But Republicans, he 
insisted, would not loosen their grip on power over the federal government because they 
continued to despise the Democrats, with whom they still associated the Civil War, “I am 
very much afraid that the same generation of northern men who fought the late war, or saw 
it fought, will never allow the ‘rebels’ or any party friendly to the ‘rebels’ to regain 
power.”  But there was the possibility of hope nonetheless.  “It is possible,” he said, “that 
the Democrats may force the country to awaken from its dull prejudice and look at facts as 
they really exist, to cease sacrificing the living present for the shadowy ghost of fear.”1  
 Though tensions between Democrats and Republicans certainly remained high 
following the end of the Civil War, there was an opportunity for a thaw.  Reconstruction 
had taken a toll on the Republican Party with its only limited success in seeking justice for 
the emancipated slaves.  A revitalized interest in commerce and southern investment began 
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to sway many northerners to favor reconciliation, creating a rift in the Republican Party.2  
Meanwhile, the abolishment of slavery had put the southern economy and its white 
southern elite at a crossroads.   Before the Civil War, southern wealth had been invested 
principally in labor instead of land, as it was in the North and its free labor economy.  
According to historian Gavin Wright, a downside to a slave economy is the lost incentive 
to “accumulate wealth by increasing the value of land, the residual claimant on economic 
returns” because one could just as easily invest in either more labor or more land, where 
the owner could be assured of a productive labor force.  With emancipation, both 
purchasing labor to increase wealth and the guarantee of a labor force to work the land 
became moot.  With a free labor system now in place, the southern elite needed to change 
its strategies of wealth accumulation to the practice of augmenting the value of land.  As 
Wright states, “former slaveowners, dispossessed of their labor, rechanneled their energies 
into the search for capital gains on nonhuman property.” Northern and southern interests 
were therefore compatible, as each recognized the profits to be made from the 
entrepreneurial and capital ventures in the new labor system.  Within the realm of 
economics and capital spending lay the mechanism by which Henry Grady would shake 
the fears of the Republican Party.  His New South vision brought Republicans and 
southern Democrats together through a political alliance: in return for the promise of 
financial gain for Republicans in the North, the federal government would give to the 
southern Democrats the self-rule they had long sought.3 
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  Democratic Congressman from Georgia Benjamin H. Hill laid out some basic 
economic components for a New South in 1870: the South should remake itself through 
the investment of southern capital into industry, thereby creating a society that would no 
longer need to depend on northern capital, manufacturing, and labor.  In the late 1870s, 
Grady too thought the South should remake itself economically, but he envisioned capital 
flowing in from the North to fund industrial investment. A primary challenge to this plan, 
however, was that, despite their interest in southern capital speculation, many northerners 
remained bitter about the end of Reconstruction and viewed the South as a hostile region to 
northerners and Republicans.  If there were to be any hope of luring northern investors 
southward, reconciliation between the regions would be imperative.4  Grady’s 
accomplishment came in altering northern perceptions of the South and its identity from an 
antagonistic region into one that had moved beyond the days of the Civil War and 
Reconstruction, that remembered its roots fondly but nonetheless looked forward to 
peaceful, affluent days for all.  The result of this new identity was economic investment 
that physically transformed the South.    
  Coupled with its calls for economic revitalization, Grady’s New South utilized 
ideas and rhetoric from the emerging Lost Cause, the collective memory of the noble Old 
South that honored the fallen Confederate soldier as a virtuous, Christian warrior.  Through 
this language of grieving and romanticizing of the past, disseminated throughout the 
country by way of the Constitution and other newspapers, Grady described noticeable 
results from early implementations of economic remodeling as evidence of the South’s 
capacity to change.  Slowly but surely, Grady reshaped southern identity and perception of 
that identity in the image of the North—modest, industrious, modern—through his paper.  
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It took the form of a New South, defined by hard work, reasonableness, industriousness, 
and, most importantly, prosperity.  
 Though Grady spoke of the foreseeable successes of this New South with vigor, he 
failed to convince all to embrace it.  That Grady was so involved in partnerships with 
government officials as an unelected civilian troubled many.  And his New South’s 
farming program, which involved a diversification of crops that the average farmer simply 
could not afford to pursue, left many farmers impoverished or perpetually tied to money 
lenders, thereby creating enemies from the agricultural community.  Indeed Grady’s vision 
did not address the concerns of many southerners, including poor and working-class whites 
and African Americans.  But his New South was never meant to please everyone, only to 
create an industrialized South that promised profits for sponsors, thereby securing his 
political alliance between white southern Democrats and Republicans.   
  
Atlanta, GA as a Forerunner for Change and Success 
 Grady’s vision for a New South did not begin with sweeping calls for extensive 
change all across the South.  It formed itself naturally out of his appeals for local efforts 
that would change and improve Atlanta as a growing city.  Indeed, the city had been 
founded as a railroad depot town where small businesses over time flourished, where local 
business owners occupied most government posts with the intention of expanding the 
city’s economic prospects.  But those early efforts of economic expansion had the 
appearance of a growth reserved solely for the capitalists—it was not an Atlantan identity 
but a capitalist identity.  Grady’s trick was to bring the local residents into the fold of 
prosperity through his rhetoric and instill in them a sense of civic duty as citizens.  
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Industrial development, specifically for Atlanta through manufacturing, promised 
prosperity for local business owners.  And by securing wealth with which to invest in 
business and municipal infrastructure, the city could physically grow to accommodate its 
increasing population and improve its civic services, such as sewage control, that would 
benefit every citizen.  The benefits of these changes were obvious, and the city’s citizens 
embraced Grady’s calls.   
  Intimately connected to the need for manufacturing as the basis of future industrial 
development was the need for cheap coal.  States with their own coalmines could pay as 
little as $1.50 per ton of coal.  Georgia, barren of such a resource, relied on the shipping of 
coal from Chattanooga, Tennessee to fuel its industrial needs, but at the far greater cost of 
$4-5 a ton.  Perhaps he was unaware of the discrepancy in price, but Grady made no 
mention of the need for cheaper coal until February 1879 when he wrote in the 
Constitution of a local manufacturer. Mr. Haimen, he informed his readers, walked into the 
offices of the newspaper and explained to the entire staff that Georgia needed cheaper coal 
if it was to succeed in competing with other manufacturing markets, especially in the 
Atlantic and Northeast regions. It is unclear whether the story unfolded the way Grady told 
it, or if it happened at all. Regardless, the encounter as told served an important function 
for Grady. It suggested that the need for cheap coal was not the brainchild of a 
newspaperman but of established, prescient manufacturers. In the article Grady confirmed 
the visitor’s credentials and professional nature, describing Mr. Haimen as “a gentleman, 
closely-shaven and business-like in all his movements, quick-eyed, alert and intelligent…” 
Haimen stated he possessed a letter from “one of the leading manufacturers of 
Pennsylvania” that expressed his desire to move his business to the South, preferably to 
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Atlanta, but that he could not justify the more expensive coal prices. “This is the way with 
them all,” Haimen allegedly said, continuing, “I tell you if Atlanta intends to go ahead with 
her wonted energy she must have cheap coal.” The solution to this problem, according to 
Haimen, was to build the Georgia Western railroad to the coalmines of Alabama.  Such a 
line would allow Atlanta to import coal more directly and cheaply.  Grady left the article 
open-ended, “And he was gone—and he left us with a great deal to think about.”5  
 In the following days, the Constitution published a series of articles detailing public 
demand for the railroad, in which the paper declared, “It may be definitely relied on that 
the Constitution will give all the space needed to this most essential scheme.  We realize 
that its [the railroad’s] building is an absolute necessity for the city of Atlanta—that it will 
give to the city a glorious future.”6  The public quickly invested itself in the enterprise; a 
short column detailed the many postcards sent to the Constitution offices inquiring as to 
the paper’s recent lack of attention paid to the railroad, indicating that the paper was 
successful in driving at least some public opinion and shaping perceptions about the needs 
of the city.7  One can see how this small series of articles very quickly created a common 
cause or a public necessity even, given the urgency of Grady’s rhetoric, around which the 
citizens could rally.  
 The growth of Atlanta would depend not only on railroads but also upon municipal 
additions that would improve the infrastructure of the city.  The Constitution published 
several articles and editorials, some written by Grady, others not, detailing these 
improvements and reporting on the economic gains of the city.  The paper assuaged fears 
of real estate property decline by asserting that overall property value had increased the 
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previous year.  Though suburban property value had declined slightly, a rise in urban 
property value due to the construction of new buildings more than compensated.8   This 
rise in property value would lead to a greater income from property taxes, which, Grady 
asserted, should be put to better use by the city in the funding of schools, police, sewers 
and street maintenance, and gas.  Grady noted that “there has really not been enough 
[funds] for the past three years to properly maintain the departments,” so this rise in 
property value further demonstrated the promising future of the city to prosper.9  The value 
of city property would continue to rise with the signing of over $80,000 in private home 
building contracts over just a few days in March 1879.  The Constitution described the 
necessity of new, affordable homes, especially tenement houses, to meet the city’s ever 
growing population.10  The increased population would require improved sanitation 
measures, an action undertaken by the city in 1879, devoting six sanitation carts (prior to 
this reform, a mere two sanitation carts served the entire city of under 40,000 people) and 
appointing two sanitation officers to survey the city and ensure its cleanliness.  Grady 
lauded this much-needed reform that would ensure the health and safety of the city, “It is 
our opinion that the whole solution of the problem is in this simple remedy—certainly all 
the solution we can offer at present.” The importance of appearances to attract business 
and investment did not elude him either, as he wrote, “…we shall expect to see the 
complaints of foul airs and unhealthy odors melt away under a general clearness and 
brightness.”11 
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 These platforms put forward by Grady and the Constitution demonstrated an 
attempt at instilling a public drive for reforms, which took on an almost mythic quality.  In 
these articles, the Constitution explicitly contrasted the reforms to come with the recent 
past: a sanitation system unfit to operate in a burgeoning city, a lack of housing only now 
addressed by the civic leaders, a rise in property value (and increase in property tax 
revenue) that had been insufficient for the previous three years.  The paper noted how these 
contrasts demonstrated Atlanta’s self-reliance, a characteristic that distinguished it from 
other southern cities, “[Atlanta] is the aggregation of small forces—the resultant of small 
persistencies.  She is built upon no colossal fortunes, nor was she laid out by compass and 
rule…All of her public enterprises have grown as she did by the putting together of small 
purses and personal energies.”12  Grady and the Constitution had linked Atlanta with a new 
local identity defined by personal investment, community building, and cooperation.   
 The city now represented a concrete example of the success of a South devoted to 
industrialization and self-improvement.  Thus, it could serve as a model on which Grady 
could base his New South platform that involved sacrifice of long-held notions in 
exchange for a forward-looking perspective that encouraged future prosperity, which is 
exactly how Grady ultimately characterized the South, “All that the South wants is peace 
and a fair chance…You go South and you find them busy, earnest, ambitious—boasting of 
their growing cities and their undeveloped interests.  They are disgusted with politics and 
in love with progress.”13  Only after his success working in and on the city of Atlanta did 
Grady possess the credentials to assert a regional program and, thereby, mold a new 
southern identity that embodied cooperation and personal, almost redemptive 
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improvement.  With the potential to host the first International Cotton Exposition, Grady 
found an opportunity to put the reformed southern society of Atlanta on display. 
 
A Vision of a New South on the World Stage: the International Cotton Exposition 
 As industrialization and manufacturing began to make headway in the South at the 
end of the 1870s, cotton farming remained the region’s most important economic driver.  
Although cotton was grown widely across the South, the region had always lacked the 
necessary equipment to process and manufacture it on a scale required to supply the nation 
with cotton product.  And so after being grown and picked in the South, cotton growers 
shipped their product north to be processed.  But by 1880, northern cotton manufacturers 
had grown dissatisfied with the quality of the cotton crop grown in the South.  That year, 
the Massachusetts economist and businessman Edward Atkinson proposed the staging of a 
grand exposition to demonstrate methods more apt to successful cotton farming.14  “There 
is no great staple of the world so wastefully handled and prepared for market as 
cotton…and there is no reason why there should not be decided improvement in its culture 
and handling,” Atkinson said in an interview with the New York Herald.15  
 Atkinson had initially thought New York City or Washington, D.C. to host this 
event, but after his official announcement of the exposition in August 1880, Atlanta 
businessmen and Grady began to lobby for the city.  Certainly Atlanta was well suited for 
the affair.  Atkinson had wanted the exposition to represent a coming together of North and 
South, connected by an improved cotton trade between the regions.  It would stand as a 
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symbol of reunification, of a nation that had moved past the hardships of the 
Reconstruction era. And its promotion of progress and self-improvement would, Atkinson 
believed, create sturdier ties than North and South had ever seen.16  Grady had already 
succeeded in beginning the process of revitalization in Atlanta; what better city, then, 
should hold the exposition than one that had already invested in its symbolic messages?  
When the contender cities were narrowed to Louisville and Atlanta, and with Louisville 
considered too far north for a southern exposition, the choice became obvious. 
 And so Grady took to work on selling and preparing for the International Cotton 
Exposition in his city.  The Constitution kept readers aware of the exposition’s 
development with frequent updates on its progress.  In October 1880, it reprinted a speech 
from Atkinson, in which he declared, “this city is ceasing to be provincial and is becoming 
cosmopolitan; it is in a state whose credit is good; in which common schools are actively 
promoted, and in which even the bluntest of free speech does not abate the welcome that is 
extended to the citizens of any state.  [Laughter and clapping of hands.]” Atkinson filled 
his speech with jokes making light of sectional tensions, emphasizing the underlying goal 
of the exposition.  The Constitution took the occasion to indulge in sharing the city’s lack 
of a grudge against the North, adding a brief anecdote regarding Atkinson, “…he 
[Atkinson] was told he could not speak here.  That if he, a famous old free soiler and 
abolitionist, attempted to talk to an Atlanta audience, he would be hissed, or insulted, 
especially if he uttered truths that might be unpalatable to our people.”  However, the city 
received him cordially and enthusiastically, “he was astonished and gratified at the 
heartiness of his reception.”17 
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  But though the exposition allowed for self-flattery, there was still business in need 
of attendance.  Grady spent the following year publishing articles detailing what he 
believed would be an inevitable success, and therefore the city needed to accommodate the 
scores of attendees.  In March 1881, seven months before the commencement of the 
exposition, Grady wrote, “this crowd will not be a helter-skelter lot of excursionists out for 
a week’s frolic, but a number of business men and capitalists, busied with material matters 
and spying out fresh fields for investment.”18  The last time the city, with a population still 
fewer than 40,000, held so many individuals was the Battle of Atlanta, and never were the 
individuals of such importance for the city’s development.  Atlanta was ill equipped to 
handle the expected attendance of more than 100,000 visitors a month for the two-and-a-
half month period, so Grady and the Constitution began frequent calls for expanded and 
new hotels. These amenities required capital investment the city did not possess, so 
exposition director general H.I. Kimball, in close contact with Grady as evidenced by 
Grady’s detailed account of Kimball’s travels, sought funds from businessmen in New 
York, Boston, and Philadelphia.  Other businessmen too, such as the landed, former planter 
Inman family, rallied to locate potential investors.19 
 But for as grand a part these rich businessmen could play, the average citizen had to 
pull his share of the weight.  When Grady wrote, “It is safe to say that Atlanta has never 
received any guests whose opinions will be so important to her as these—never opened her 
gates to men who can do so much for her advancement, if they are properly treated and 
pleased with the outlook,” he made clear that not just the city, not just the exposition, but 
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each inhabitant of Atlanta stood center stage for the country to see.20   Each had a part to 
play in keeping the city presentable and in handling the masses for the foreseeable future.  
The citizens rallied to his call, going so far as to offer their own private residences without 
payment as accommodations to exposition visitors.  Such participation from the average 
citizen would offer northern visitors, “an opportunity of seeing the inside of Southern 
homes, of enjoying the famous dishes for which the Southern housewife has been noted, 
and of studying Southern civilization at home…” The additional provided housing could 
“comfortably lodge 15,000 people a day.”21 
 On the day of its opening, October 5, 1881, the exposition was not yet complete, its 
scale so massive and grand that the Constitution stated, “That it should be even partially 
ready is almost a miracle.”22  Shortly after its opening though, the exposition would be 
complete and draw almost 300,000 visitors during its two-and-a-half month run, a number 
short of its projected attendance, but impressive all the same.23  The Constitution lauded 
the instructive nature of the exhibits, “Our exposition is doing far more and far better than 
the gratification of the curiosity of people.  It is teaching them lessons in industrial 
progress and domestic economy.”24  Though such bombast undoubtedly served a self-
promotional purpose, there is no denying that northern visitors were affected by this new 
southern culture.  Newspapers across the country gave their praises, “[Atlanta] has grown 
to be a thriving city…called in name, which appears to the writer it might be called in 
reality, the Chicago of the south,” wrote one visitor from the Cincinnati Gazette.25  In 
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February 1882, Edward Atkinson published “Significant Aspects of the Atlanta Cotton 
Exposition,” concluding that sectional tensions between North and South had been 
dissipated:  
 
It surely marks an important era in the history of this country, that even the 
abolitionists of old time can here meet ex-Confederate officers of high rank, 
and while conversing, without any sense of animosity, about the events and 
ideas which controlled the ante-war period, can also take counsel together 
as to the common interests and common needs of the future—almost as if 
slavery and war had never been.26 
 
In hosting the International Cotton Exposition, Atlanta stood as an early success of 
Grady’s New South vision, whose messages of unity and welcome to northern visitors 
were disseminated by Grady in the Constitution throughout the exposition’s run.  
Attendees and press alike encountered a South very much different from the memory of the 
discordant, hostile Reconstruction states still lingering in the back of the mind.  Atlanta 
demonstrated that not only was development achievable but that it had already begun, and 
the more than 300 reporters whom Grady had brought from across the country 
disseminated that message.  Atlanta became a symbol for progress and a monument to the 
end of sectionalism, and Grady the warrior at the vanguard of the New South.  But though 
he had achieved success, there remained skepticism from the northern elite that the South 
could prove a completely safe and viable investment, a belief Grady quashed when he 
addressed the New England Society in 1886.27    
 
The Political Alliance Secured 
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 In its entire 81-year history, the New England Society never hosted a speaker from 
the South, but there sat Henry Grady in Delmonico’s restaurant in New York City amongst 
a crowd of 360 distinguished northern gentlemen.  Though Grady may have felt 
uncomfortable, especially with former Union general William T. Sherman, who had 
famously burned Atlanta before commencing his March to the Sea, in attendance and 
slated to speak before Grady, he nonetheless gathered his wits and delivered a rousing 
speech on southern progress.  It is in this speech that Grady so adeptly captured his vision, 
and never before was that vision disseminated so freely and so extensively.  Here, in 
December 1886, the New South idea emerged fully formed. 
 His opening lines were bold: “There was a South of slavery and secession—that 
South is dead.  There is a South of union and freedom—that South, thank God, is living, 
breathing, growing every hour.”  Grady made this claim, taken, he said, from a speech 
delivered by prominent southern Democratic Congressman Benjamin H. Hill at Tammany 
Hall, even before thanking the Society for the invitation to speak; he had made his thesis, 
and used the remainder of his time to endear himself, and by extension the South as a 
whole, to these northern Republican gentlemen.28   
 Central to that endearment was the Lost Cause, a distinctly southern remembrance 
of the Civil War that recalled fondly the days of slavery and the honest, good Confederate 
soldier.  Though northern Republicans would not sympathize with the Confederacy itself, 
they did understand loss and fallen soldiers.  Grady took advantage of this angle to depict a 
humble South of broken men and families who sought only to fix their battered lives, “I 
                                                 
28 “The New South” Speech as reprinted in Barton C. Shaw, “Henry Grady Heralds the New South,” Atlanta 
Historical Journal 30, no. 2 (1986): 58-65.  There is no evidence that Benjamin H. Hill actually spoke these 
words at Tammany Hall or in any other speech.  Whether he did or whether Grady wished to bring authority 
to his opening lines is uncertain. 
49  
tell you of another army that sought its home at the close of the late war—an army that 
marched home in defeat and not in victory—in pathos and not in splendor, but in glory that 
equaled yours, and to hearts as loving as ever welcomed heroes home!”  This formerly 
Confederate South was caring and noble, a people that accepted defeat and marched 
forward, “What does he do—this hero in gray with a heart of gold? Does he sit down in 
sullenness and despair? Not for a day. Surely God, who had stripped him of his prosperity, 
inspired him in his adversity.”  And with the wisdom gained from hardship, the former 
soldiers, again citizens of equal status to their Union counterparts, took to the task of 
rebuilding, of cleaning the wreckage and of transforming their destroyed cities into ones 
“brave and beautiful.”29   
 Remembering the past did not inhibit southerners but rather inspired them.  Grady 
spoke of the South’s new manufacturing processes and markets, having embraced the 
northern practices in industry to create prosperity, “We have sowed towns and cities in the 
place of theories and put business above politics. We have challenged your spinners in 
Massachusetts and your iron-makers in Pennsylvania.”  Grady depicted these southerners 
not as vindictive war criminals but as modest men who wanted only progress and peace.  
In fact, Grady asserted, it was not the South that prevented an acceptable reunion but the 
Republicans of the North, with their hateful memories of the Confederacy, “Will she 
permit the prejudice of war to remain in the hearts of the conquerors, when it has died in 
the hearts of the conquered? Will she transmit this prejudice to the next generation, that in 
their hearts…it may perpetuate itself?”  Grady had flipped the narrative on its head—the 
South believed in its cause, lost, and had accepted its defeat and moved forward, while 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
50  
northerners had perpetuated a prejudice through waving the bloody shirt, preventing any 
hope for reunification.  The South had changed; the South was new—it was the North that 
was locked in the past.30  
 But this was no insult.  In fact it was exactly what northern businessmen wanted to 
hear: the Civil War was truly over and no animosity remained, thus ensuring a welcome 
environment.  The South had taken to new work, and, as a result, was rife for investment to 
be mined for profit. And all that Grady had accomplished in the South prior to this 
speech—the changing landscape of Atlanta, the International Cotton Exposition—gave 
weight and authenticity to Grady’s words.  Grady recognized that these northern 
Republican businessmen needed a push in terms of how they viewed the South as both an 
economic opportunity and as an identity.  And this identity, once viewed as disparate and 
incongruous, now mirrored the northern ideology of work, progress, and prosperity. 31   
 Newspapers, such as the Washington Post, the Boston Herald, and the New York 
Herald, spread Grady’s words throughout the country, commenting on Grady’s ideas or 
reprinting the speech.  Some papers even called for Grady to run as Vice President.  His 
fame spread widely, and he became a national sensation.  He began to write less for the 
Constitution and other newspapers and instead traveled nationwide to give speeches.  But 
he did write in 1889 a series of six articles, predictably titled “The New South,” for the 
New York Ledger in which he elaborated on the ideas from his New England Society 
speech.  In them, he did not lose the pageantry with which he adorned his speech, delving 
into descriptive tangents, such as the conditions met by a Confederate soldier and friend of 
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Grady’s upon his return from the war, to paint southerners as homely, modest, and 
determined.  But he also provided more specific facts and figures to demonstrate the 
churning of southern progress.   He cited principally the growing number of millionaires 
and wealthy individuals in southern cities, the increased number of iron furnaces in the 
region, the cheaper cost of production of iron in the South than in the North, and the 
prosperity brought by the cotton crop, among other indicators.  He presented the New 
South as a near utopia of compassion and hard work: 
We shall see how the warhorses went to the furrow.  How the waste places 
were clothed.  How the earth smiled at their rude and questioning touch.  
How the mountains opened and disclosed treasures not dreamed of before.  
How, from chaos and desolation, the currents of trade trickled and swelled 
and took orderly way.  How rivers were spanned and wildernesses pierced 
with the iron rail.  How things despised in the old days of prosperity, in 
adversity won unexpected value.  How frugality came with misfortune, 
fortitude with sorrow, and with necessity invention.32 
 
 This was a New South, Grady suggested, reborn from the past and often 
misrepresented by the North.  Grady had cleared up the messages and meanings behind the 
South; the region’s people were motivated, had advanced beyond past gripes, and were 
ready and willing to work.  They extended their hands in friendship to Republicans—they 
accepted it.  Through Grady’s words, his New South had achieved a political truce. 
Dissent 
 Grady had succeeded in allying the white Democratic South with the Republican 
North, but though his envisioning of the New South was widely accepted, it was by no 
means universally so.  Even from the outset Grady’s New South threatened traditionalist 
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southerners who feared the influx of northern immigrants to build the labor force that 
Grady had proposed.  And through methods that are hazy at best and downright illegal at 
worst, Grady had positioned himself with the leaders of Georgia’s government in such a 
way that protected him and his vision from dissenters who saw through the utopic veil of 
his New South. 
 Scandal marked the beginning of the alliance between Grady and Georgia’s 
Bourbon government.  In 1880, General John B. Gordon announced his resignation from 
his office in the U.S. Senate.  A popular Georgia figure, Gordon had served in the Senate 
since 1873 and had four years left in his term that he won in 1878.  Gordon claimed he 
wished to pursue a more lucrative job in business rather than continue to serve in the 
Senate.  He would accept a job as general counsel for the Louisville and Nashville railroad.  
Georgians were shocked to learn that Governor Alfred H. Colquitt had named Joseph E. 
Brown to replace Gordon.  Brown, a former governor of Georgia and then president of the 
Western and Atlantic railroad, had renounced his Confederate ties quickly after surrender 
at Appomattox, became a Republican, and served at the forefront of Reconstruction in the 
South; his appointment had the stench of betrayal and corruption.33  
 Though the public lambasted Colquitt and especially Brown, their anger was 
misguided, as it was Grady who had orchestrated the whole endeavor.  Because railroads 
were such a central component of his New South vision, Grady had been cultivating 
knowledge and connections from and with railroad businesses.  Much of his time had been 
spent with H. Victor Newcomb, president of the Louisville and Nashville railroad.  It 
seems Grady, having already known the men from his travels as a reporter, had put 
                                                 
33 Ralph L Eckert, “The Breath of Scandal: John B. Gordon, Henry W. Grady, and the Resignation-
Appointment Controversy of May 1880,” Georgia Historical Quarterly 69, no. 3 (1985): 315-330. 
53  
Newcomb in contact with Colquitt and Brown.  Telegrams, some of which are encrypted in 
cypher, from 1880 between the men reveal their maneuverings and aims to take the 
government.  Now Grady had a government with which to work that was indebted to him 
for his role in its establishment and also possessed a similar mindset as him regarding the 
future of the state.  And it certainly didn’t hurt that all parties involved had a strong 
connection to or lived in Atlanta.34   
 The event known as the Resignation-Appointment Controversy and the formation 
of the so-called Atlanta Ring government were known or at least suspected by the general 
public.  Newspapers in cities like Macon and Augusta, with agriculture-based economies, 
did not withhold their ire directed at the state government, which had essentially 
circumvented the polls to establish itself.  These other cities had been competing with 
Atlanta for years, often for railroad contracts and for the location of the state capital, and 
were now subjected to an unelected government with clear ties to Atlanta, suggesting they 
faced an inevitable future of antagonism due to Atlanta-directed favoritism.  Grady’s 
allegiance to the government, marked by the Constitution’s endorsement of Brown despite 
his Republican ties, signaled future contention with agriculture-based towns and farmers 
both in Georgia and in the South as a whole.35 
 Because Grady’s New South depended on state government support, keeping the 
Atlanta Ring intact was tantamount to success.  The majority of the South remained 
agricultural, and so most of the South’s voters were farmers.  Therefore, to keep the likes 
of Colquitt and Brown in office, Grady needed to appeal to the southern farmer.  Keeping 
in tone with its themes of independence and self-actualization, the New South called for 
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farmers to continue to grow cotton, the staple cash crop of the South, but to also grow a 
secondary cash crop.  Furthermore, farmers should grow for subsistence and refrain from 
utilizing commercial fertilizers.  Such practices would allow the farmer to spend his wealth 
locally, which would minimize the outward flow of wealth from the South and thereby 
allow the South to be economically independent.  Grady advertised this plan in the 
Constitution to every farmer, regardless of the type of crop grown, his financial situation, 
the amount of land he owned, the local climate and terrain, etc.36     
 This system may have worked for the richest planters, but for the average farmer 
such a system proved dangerous.  Most farmers had little money with which to support 
themselves, and the credit system in place, run by merchants with high interest rates rather 
than banks (which were slow to loan), would only pay out if the farmer grew cotton, the 
only crop sure to sell for cash. Farmers that embraced the program found themselves 
unable to pay their loans and forced to work on an unstable credit system.37  Frustration 
with Grady and his economic proposals led to the rise of the Farmers’ Alliance in Georgia, 
pinning Grady and other proponents of his New South as enemies and eventually declaring 
of farmers, “You cultivate the crop with hard work, and the North and the East does the 
reaping.”38 
 But Grady insisted that this method of farming was most conducive to success, and 
the Constitution published articles attesting to its effectiveness.  According to one essay by 
Grady, the 1000 most prosperous farmers in the state of Georgia all claimed to practice 
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diversified crop growing and subsistence farming to complement their cash crops.39  And 
even though cotton proved the only sustainable crop, and only barely sustainable at that, 
the Constitution still called for a decrease in its growth, “[A farmer] must not expect to 
grow rich raising cotton, for that’s a speculation even with the most experienced 
planters.”40  Even though Grady admitted the farm program’s disappointment in 1887, he 
failed to supply an alternative and laid the groundwork for the Populist revolt in the 
following decade. 
 Other dissenters to Grady’s New South claimed it rested on the laurels of social 
injustices.  Child labor was prevalent throughout new factories and mills, so much so that 
by 1900 children under sixteen composed 30 percent of the cotton mill labor force.  They 
claimed that banks, merchants, trusts, and railroads created these abhorrent social abuses 
and fingered the economic proposals as a friend and promoter of these institutions.  
Virginia minister Alexander J. McKelway said later that anyone, Grady included, who 
allied himself with the phrase “New South” ought to be called “the Mercenaries.”41 
 But those who rejected this New South vision, at least in the 1880s, were 
unsuccessful in inhibiting its development.  The image disseminated by Grady and the 
press told only of success in the South, and that promise of growth and prosperity could 
not tarnish Grady or his New South’s image.  Wealth could hide any social ill that may 
have arisen, and so Grady focused much of his program in economics, celebrating the 
rewards investment would bring.  But if the surface of Grady’s vision emphasized 
reconciliation between Democrats and Republicans and shared fortune, its heart beat for a 
different matter entirely: the role of blacks in the South.  Grady’s New South vision did 
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address blacks, but in such a way that misrepresented and proved detrimental to the black 
experience for the sake of establishing a de facto segregated southern society.  That Jim 
Crow policies began soon after the New South vision took root in the United States is no 
coincidence.
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CHAPTER THREE: The Racial Program of Henry Grady’s New South 
 
 On the night of February 6, 1871, Rome, Georgia witnessed “clashes of disputed 
severity” between Rome’s black population and a group of whites with Ku Klux Klan 
affiliation.1  Henry Grady, then editor of the Rome Commercial, inadvertently drew 
himself into the fray. After Grady published an article suggesting B.F. Sawyer, the editor 
of the Rome Courier, the Commercial’s rival, had been caught by the Klan and forced to 
dance for them, the Courier issued a retort, stating, “We recognized the snigger of the little 
fellow in the spotted shirt, who rode the little mule, and…we are now convinced that our 
suspicions were correct, and that the tail end of the Ku-Klux was no one else than our 
facetious young friend, Henry W. Grady.”2  It is clear that Grady and Sawyer, engaged in a 
friendly rivalry during those early years of Grady’s career, but it is difficult to determine 
whether the two men were more involved with the Klan than their articles let on.  What is 
clear is Grady later published a straightforward editorial in the Commercial urging the 
Klan to remain generally inactive, “Remember, brothers, that the strength and power of 
any secret organization rests in the attribute of mystery and hidden force…Every time you 
act you weaken your strength; then be quiet.  If an inexorable necessity calls for action, act 
promptly, with decision, and do nothing more than is absolutely necessary.”3  The 
congressional joint committee exploring KKK activity cited this article as evidence linking 
Grady to the Klan, though Grady was never subpoenaed to testify himself.  
                                                 
1 Raymond B. Nixon, Henry W. Grady: Spokesman of the New South (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1943), 81-82.  
Founded in 1865, the First KKK formed as a vigilante force meant to upend the freedmen’s newfound liberty 
and restore the leaders of the Confederacy to power through intimidation and violence of blacks and their 
white allies.  The First KKK was formally disbanded in 1869 but groups remained active until 1871. See 
David Mark Chalmers, Hooded Americanism: the history of the Ku Klux Klan (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1987).  
2 “Murder Will Out,” The Rome Courier, n.d. 
3 Cited in Testimony Taken by Joint Selection Committee, VII, 886, in Nixon, 83. 
58  
 Whether or not he was involved with the Klan, Grady at the very least quietly 
approved of its mission and viewed it as a general good, at least at the time.  That slavery 
had ended and that blacks had received suffrage, he thought, did not overwrite the fact that 
the black race was inferior to the white.  It meant only that there was need for a new 
system or mechanism to keep blacks in their proper place.  For some, the Klan, with its 
intimidation and terrorism tactics, operated as that mechanism.  But the image of a violent 
gang of white southerners doling out racial ‘justice’ was unsavory, especially if the South 
hoped to ever achieve reconciliation with the North, which, as a Republican dominated 
region, depended on the black vote.  But Grady offered an alternative social system to 
KKK rule of widespread terror and violence as a form of control.  Grady’s New South 
vision was a political appeasement that proposed a social system rooted in racial separation 
that allowed for economic progress and profits, promising prosperity for North and South 
alike.  This system presented to northerners a South in racial harmony and to southerners a 
society separated by color; it was through the political mollification of northerners and 
southerners that Grady’s New South vision reinforced white southern identity to violent 
extremes, laying the groundwork for the era of Jim Crow. 
 C. Vann Woodward argues that the racial order of the South following the Civil 
War was not as definitive as many would believe.  He writes, “Before [the] triumph [of 
Jim Crow] was complete…there transpired a period of history whose significance has been 
hitherto neglected.  Exploitation [of blacks] there was in that period, as in other periods 
and in other regions, but it did not follow then that the exploited had to be ostracized.”  
Woodward further contends that the extreme racism and humiliation that characterized the 
classical Jim Crow period was not a natural outgrowth of the end of Reconstruction but 
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resulted from a weakening of the social forces that kept those extremist views in check.  As 
the stabilizers of those social forces—held up by the courts, the government, and 
influential southern conservatives and Republicans—weakened and gave way, hatred and 
fanaticism from the most radical and racist southern whites intensified and overpowered 
the more moderate attitudes.4  Historian Jane Dailey supports this view with her 
exploration of the manifestation of political tension in the post-Reconstruction South and 
its effects on race relations and the development of Jim Crow.  She argues, “Late 
nineteenth century formulations of white supremacist racial ideology did not represent an 
easy continuation of past oppressions.  It was not at all clear after the war what antebellum 
racial hierarchies could be reproduced in the context of the Reconstruction Amendments to 
the federal Constitution.”5  The implication of this argument suggests that there was a 
period in which the future of race relations in the South was uncertain, and this uncertainty 
was central to Grady’s New South vision.  His vision did not call for the reestablishment of 
the old racial order—the racial relationship rooted in slavery.  Instead it offered a new 
system of racial control that upheld southern blacks’ political rights whilst also depriving 
them of, as Grady wrote, their “social equality” in the public sphere through racial 
separation.  By preserving the uncorrupted black Republican vote but concurrently 
sustaining a racially separated society, this system would maintain the political alliance 
between southern Democrats and Republicans.  
 The challenge of realizing his New South vision, one that ultimately proved its 
undoing, was to make it appeal to all parties: whites and blacks to be sure, but also 
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Democrats, Republicans, northerners, and southerners.  It needed to show blacks, 
Republicans, and northerners that the South had fundamentally changed in that it had 
moved past sectionalism, that it had renounced slavery, that it would not tamper with 
elections by harassing Republican voters, that blacks lived in a society that offered them 
boundless opportunity to advance, and that to invest in southern industry and infrastructure 
was profitable.  To southern whites and Democrats, the New South could not abandon the 
traditional values of the Old South—the chivalry associated with plantation life, the 
fondness for fallen Confederate heroes, and the inherent superiority of whites over 
blacks—nor could it fall to Republican rule or be generally “Yankeefied,” referring to a 
South that resembled the North in its values, practices, and customs.6  All the while, it 
needed to demonstrate that progress could be achieved and be profitable. Grady understood 
this balancing act, and this is how he sold his idea of a New South. 
 Grady’s New South vision unfolded gradually over a decade.  In the 1870s and 
early 1880s, Grady directed his message primarily to the North, where he argued that 
blacks and whites lived in harmony in the South and worked together to advance their 
shared society.  This would indicate that the North could trust the South, that the region 
had relinquished its sectional and political hatred and now presented a safe opportunity for 
northerners to live, invest, work, and even vote in the South.  Once northerners expressed 
stronger interests in southern investment and embraced the South’s change of heart and its 
political leniency, his message shifted to one enforcing white supremacy.  Whites and 
blacks alike, he argued, desired a system of racial separation, and that this was the best 
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way to maintain a peaceable racial society.  Until the end of the 1880s, these messages 
satisfied the investors, the politicians, the southern and northern whites and blacks, and 
both the Democratic and Republican Parties, as evidenced by the universal acclaim and 
laudatory oratory that characterized press descriptions of Grady and his views after his 
New South address in 1886.  
 But Grady’s New South vision began to fall apart and give way to Jim Crow 
exactly because it played to so many parties.  Grady could never maintain a loyalty to the 
southern Democrats while also pushing for a tolerance in the South that would continue to 
please the North.  And the truce he helped broker (in the early 1880s) and secured (after 
the New South address) with the North that exchanged the assurance of profitability for 
southern control over how to handle the race question began to give way in 1888 when 
Republicans demonstrated their impatience with the lack of progress in the matter by 
electing civil rights advocate Benjamin Harrison to the presidency.7  Though following his 
death newspapers across the country remarked how, for both regions, Grady represented a 
warrior in the fight for reconciliation, who bridged a gap between two fuming regions, they 
failed to acknowledge that he had instead established a fragile reconciliation between 
northern whites and southern whites that could break at any moment under the duress of 
the Democratic-Republican clash of ideologies and struggle for the black vote.  Indeed one 
must wonder what Grady had left to offer the two parties when he died in December 1889, 
just as the Jim Crow era was fully emerging; though each was reconciled in terms of the 
Civil War, they were yet again clashing through politics over the civil rights of blacks, for 
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both Democrats and Republicans had moved beyond the vagueness and tepid ease of 
Grady’s New South vision.  
 This chapter examines exactly how Grady instituted the racial components of his 
New South vision.  Beginning in 1876, with his reports on the Ellenton Riot in South 
Carolina and in his political writings from 1876 to 1878, Grady broke with many in the 
southern Democratic Party in his depiction of a future southern society where political 
intimidation of blacks would give way to peaceful coexistence.  He developed this portrait 
fully when Atlanta was designated to host the International Cotton Exposition in 1881, due 
in no small part to Grady’s efforts; one can see how Grady manipulated expectations of the 
South to create a tolerant and welcoming region through the exposition itself and through 
his and other northern reporters’ articles on the event.  As the federal government began to 
make clear that the extent of civil rights for blacks would be limited, such as with the 
Supreme Court’s 1883 overturn of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, Grady’s racial policy 
became more overt in both his articles and speeches; he directly called for a society that 
was “equal but separate” and that, in a society of mixed race, such a policy was necessary 
for cohabitation between the races.   
 In charting this path to Jim Crow, it becomes clear that Grady’s New South vision 
represents a transitional period between the Reconstruction/Lost Cause era and the Jim 
Crow era.  For though the vision drew heavily from rhetoric resembling the Lost Cause, 
itself emerging during this period, in its fondness for the Old South and traditional 
southern values, it concurrently offered a glimpse into a post-Plessy v. Ferguson future.  It 
is therefore evident that it is best to view this time between Reconstruction and the full-
blown emergence of a system of segregation not as a standalone event but as a decade-long 
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bridge between two distinct systems.  In viewing the epoch in this manner, we get a fuller 
picture of what the “New South” meant to Grady and how the tension between economic 
aspirations and racial disunity fired a political divergence that set the South on a dark, 
difficult road. 
 
The Rhetoric of a Riot 
 As a correspondent for the New York Herald, Henry Grady travelled to Ellenton, 
South Carolina in early October of 1876 to cover the aftermath of the Ellenton Riot. It was 
a “Three Days’ War!” his headline read, between a cadre of black townsmen and several 
corps of white militiamen and members of rifle clubs.  Grady explained in the 
accompanying article, “On the 15th of September the house of Mr. Alonzo Harley, at 
Silverton, was entered by two negroes [Peter Williams and Fred Pope] with burglarious 
intent.”  The wife of Mr. Harley was alone at home with her young son.  Testimonies 
claimed the two men “beat her severely” with a club, but Mrs. Harley, despite her beating, 
managed to find her husband’s gun and “frightened them off.”  In response, the following 
morning, a mob of white men found, shot, and wounded Peter Williams, who confessed to 
the attempted burglary and named his accomplice, Pope, as the one who had assaulted 
Harley.  A band of white men confronted a group of blacks who were “terribly excited, 
armed, and defiant” and who claimed Pope was not with them.  Though an agreement to 
disperse was reached by both parties, “a score of armed negroes jumped up…” and fired 
upon the departing whites, killing a white bystander.  The next morning, a company of two 
hundred armed whites, consisting mainly of local rifle club members and members from 
neighboring August, Georgia, assembled to subdue the “several bands of negroes…with 
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murderous intent.”   Fighting between the two groups occurred throughout Aiken County 
for three days until South Carolina Governor Daniel H. Chamberlain, a Republican, 
dispatched federal troops to end the fighting.  Grady put the number of dead at two whites 
and eighteen blacks.8   
 Grady rooted his stance on the riot—its causes, the characters of the men 
involved—in racial undertones.  He closed his article summarizing the riot with his take on 
the dispositions of blacks, “I am convinced that the great masses of negroes in South 
Carolina, as well as elsewhere, are perfectly peaceable and harmless.  It is only when their 
leaders stir their passions and appeal to their prejudices that they are vicious and 
dangerous.” He even came to their defense, to an extent, maintaining, “I can hardly blame 
them for rallying at first to protect Frederick Pope.  They believed that Williams, their 
favorite, had been lynched and that Pope was being hunted down.  They very naturally 
thought of protecting him.” Nonetheless, Grady clearly viewed blacks as the perpetrators, 
easily incited to violence, and whites as “cool, determined…defensive.”9 
 Though he noted “how hard it has been to get to the truth,” Grady maintained that 
his account, gathered from the “fullest affidavits from both whites and blacks,” was wholly 
truthful.10  But disregarding the hard facts surrounding the event (number of the dead, 
dates, etc.), there remains a discrepancy: Grady, and the many other newspapers that wrote 
stories on the riot, painted a picture of a race riot, when evidence suggests that the riot was 
equally as politically driven as it was racially driven, if not more so.  With the election of 
1876 a mere month and a half away, political tensions between Democrats and 
Republicans would have been high. Rifle clubs, at least those involved in the riot, played a 
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role in Ellenton that was primarily political in nature; firstly, in their lynching activities, 
the clubs often, though not always, “killed blacks on the assumption that they were also 
Republicans,” and, secondly, the clubs served as the local mechanism of political 
intimidation.  The Democratic strategy for the 1876 election involved the belief that if 
enough black, and it was assumed Republican, individuals could be dissuaded from voting 
through intimidation and violence, then the Democrats could unseat Governor 
Chamberlain.  That “the lives of the Citizens in the line of the road [of Aiken County] will 
be constantly placed in jeopardy by a renewal of these disturbances until after the Election” 
gives credence to the underlying political motivations propelling the riot. It is a strategy 
not unfamiliar to the many southern states, and bears resemblance to the “Mississippi 
Plan,” which Democrats had created in 1875.11  
 Rifle Clubs throughout the state had caused much anxiety for South Carolina’s 
Republican non-members, so much so that in October, following the riot, Governor 
Chamberlain issued a proclamation calling for the disarming of the clubs altogether on the 
following grounds:  The clubs carried state arms but were not subject to the regulations of 
a militia, raising issues of their legality, and the number of clubs rose by 200 in August of 
1876 and numbered over 14,000 members by late 1876.12  The Democratic rifle clubs 
clearly presented a threat of corrupting the impending election, and a number of 
Republican county officials and citizens wrote to Chamberlain asking for protection from 
the clubs, “who tell us in plain words that they mean to kill us out before this coming 
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Election.”13  This would suggest that the rifle clubs involved themselves in the aftermath of 
the Harley burglary not solely to deal out racially motivated justice to the perpetrators, but 
to use the burglary as an impetus to dispense election intimidation.   
 It is unusual then that Grady created a distinctly racial portrait of a far more 
complex event, especially when he would have been aware of the political tensions 
surrounding the Ellenton Riot and the clubs, having been in the county when Governor 
Chamberlain issued his proclamation.  A day after the announcement, Grady even wrote 
positively of them, “These ‘rifle clubs’ have been well drilled, are filled with the very best 
men, and can be rallied in a jiffy.”  By contrast, he described the “dozen or so” legal, state-
sponsored black companies of the militia as drawing a “mob of half-armed darkies,” who 
together commit “petty outrages…almost constantly.”14   
 This is not to suggest some conspiracy to defend the rifle clubs and unseat the 
Republican governor of South Carolina, but it is certainly curious to ignore the clear 
political implications of the riot.  Grady clearly viewed the spark of the Ellenton Riot as 
steeped in black-on-white sexuality and the confrontation as predominantly white versus 
black, rather than as Democratic versus Republican.  This perspective created a sense of 
foreboding, one that Democrats touted and played upon—with each confrontation between 
blacks and whites, the “color line” would continue to “stiffen,” and though, Grady wrote, 
blacks “vastly prefer working quietly in the field to engaging in guerilla warfare in defence 
of a principle that they do not understand or appreciate,” they’re continued role in the 
“perpetuation of strife” risked all-out war.  “What extremities they [violent black leaders] 
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can lead the poor blacks to and at what point the whites will confront them, the future—the 
near future, I very much fear—will disclose.”15   
 It seems that Grady interpreted the events in Ellenton through the lens of the 
Democratic Party and some of the racial rhetoric associated with it, and perhaps this is why 
he ignored the political ramifications and underlying foundations of the Ellenton Riot—to 
describe his party’s subterfuge would damage the party and prove politically and socially 
suicidal.  Grady stood with the Democrats through and through in the 1870s; most notably, 
he ardently attacked Republicans, particularly Rutherford B. Hayes and his victory in the 
presidential election of 1876 under the so-called “corrupt bargain” :  
 
The country will repudiate the fraud by which the republicans have 
established their usurpation, just as surely as the time arrives for them to 
vote.  Our only danger is this: that Hayes, by glittering offers…will 
disintegrate our southern democracy, and put us in danger of losing some of 
the southern states.16   
 
 
Locally, in Georgia, he vigorously campaigned for Alfred H. Colquitt, a secessionist and 
Confederate Major General, in the gubernatorial election of 1876, saying of him, “I have 
never found such brace honesty, such sweet dignity, such gentleness and grace and 
sincerity—such loyalty and such winning tenderness, as I have found in this Christian 
gentleman.”17  Colquitt, a wealthy lawyer with strong ties to the planter-elite of the 
antebellum South, embodied the Lost Cause cavalier, a Christian soldier combatting 
Radical Reconstruction who possessed a strong war record.18   
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 Grady’s loyalty to Colquitt so early in his postwar political career and his 
outspoken critique of Hayes undoubtedly proved advantageous and laid the groundwork 
for Grady’s heavy involvement in Georgia’s government and the founding of the Atlanta 
Ring in 1880.  But it also indicates just how entrenched Grady placed himself in the needs 
of specifically southern Democrats.  For Grady felt that, in aiding Hayes’s ascendency, the 
party’s northern constituents and leaders had betrayed the South, “After a season of dilly-
dallying the northern democrats, amorously holding back when they should have been 
bold, a compromise…was proposed and accepted…The Tilden Campaign received its fatal 
stab six weeks ago…from the hands of Mr. Abram S. Hewitt [Chairmen of the Democratic 
National Committee].”19  The southern Democrats wanted self-rule, free from interfering 
Republicans, to handle their issues, namely the race issue, themselves.  While Hayes 
ultimately gave the South the very freedom they desired, they could not know it at the 
time, and took the concession “that Hayes will turn his back upon the men who have 
helped him to the presidency, and give justice to a long-suffering section of the common 
country” with heavy skepticism.20     
 But though he had obvious allegiance to the Democrats, to view Grady’s 
journalistic choices regarding Ellenton as solely party driven ignores the fact that he also 
relieved the majority of blacks of responsibility in the riot, and this represented a distinctly 
non-party stance.  Rather than partake in the stark, unabashed racism that characterized the 
southern Democrats, Grady wrote with a far milder tone; instead of exemplifying the 
entirety of blacks as militant, angry Negroes of Reconstruction, Grady seemingly looked 
forward to a more apparently unified racial society, where the majority of blacks lived 
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harmoniously, immersed in their work and kept to their own affairs.  Tellingly, Grady 
wrote his Ellenton articles not in a southern newspaper but for the New York Herald.  The 
picture of southern society he described for this northern, Republican audience possessed 
far more appeal than a civilization engaged in an endless tug-of-war between the races.  
That picture also bears resemblance to an idea that Grady would flesh out in subsequent 
years—the idea of a South where the races coexisted in peace and prosperity.  The Ellenton 
articles contain rhetoric of racial peace that Grady subtly coupled with language suggesting 
an inferior black intellect (“engaging in guerilla warfare in defence of a principle that they 
do not understand or appreciate”); they therefore indicate the beginnings of a message that 
would become central to his vision of the New South—a peaceful society governed by 
white supremacy.21  After Grady moved to Atlanta to work first as a reporter and soon after 
as managing editor and part-owner of the Atlanta Constitution, a portrait of racial 
cohabitation in the South became integral to his future endeavors.  
 By 1879, Grady began pushing harder for internal improvements to the city of 
Atlanta and, by 1880, to the South as a whole, ultimately writing of what would become 
the New South vision.  This vision may have boasted of economic advancement and 
progress, but at its heart rested a need for appearances: the appearance of racial unity and 
of political and sectional accord.   It was imperative in Grady’s opinion to gain the trust of 
the northern Republican states and businesses, for without them the South would have no 
capital with which to build their infrastructure.   
 But the general opinion in the North was profoundly negative; northern acolytes 
and newspapers had remained skeptical of the South following the end of Reconstruction, 
with the New York Times scathingly writing not long before:  
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The assumption that the South is wholly on the side of the Democracy is a 
mistake that would be impossible, if those who base their argument were 
not accustomed to consider the original white population as properly ‘the 
South,’ and to treat as of secondary importance the enfranchised freedmen 
and the Northerners who have gone South since the restoration of 
peace…The South is a unit for the Democracy only on the supposition that 
by terrorism and fraud genuine Republican majorities may be overcome…It 
has yet to give the first earnest sign of its wish to let bygones be bygones 
and to turn to the best account the circumstances that exist.22 
 
It is clear that racial tension, stemming from white Democratic and black Republican 
conflict, formed the basis of this skepticism of the South.  Racial tension was also a fairly 
visible detail that could be corrected, or at least seemingly corrected to northern eyes to an 
extent that would be deemed acceptable.  If Grady could convince these northern investors, 
presses, and acolytes that the South had become racially adjusted to the present, it would 
demonstrate that the South had moved past the Civil War and Reconstruction, that it no 
longer favored waving the bloody shirt. 
 
The Racial Agenda of the International Cotton Exposition  
 This was exactly the plan when the city of Atlanta began undertaking preparations 
for the Atlanta Cotton Exposition of 1881. Edward Atkinson, the northern cotton 
businessman who had concocted the idea of a cotton exposition, expressly stated that the 
goal of the exposition was one of reconciliation between North and South, “you need also 
to welcome and not to compel by social ostracism the true men and women from the north 
who have or shall come here to aid you…” Equally as important was the demonstrated 
progress of southern blacks, “We want to see the colored farmers’ cotton in competition 
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with the white farmers’ pays.  We want to prove to you that education pays, and that the 
more faith that we have in the capacity of your own black laborers, the better cotton will 
become year by year.”23  But Atkinson made clear that his interest in black laborers was 
one rooted purely in economic indicators, “My own observations tell me that the progress 
of the colored people of the Atlantic states…is one of the marvels of economic 
history…”24  Atkinson’s comments suggest a concern that is only economic in nature; 
northern businessmen wanted to know that the South could be trusted, that northerners 
would not be ostracized or degraded, and that they could get a return on investment.  To 
see black laborers and farmers work and, in some cases, succeed would indicate that very 
change in mentality, but nothing more.  And indeed many of these northerners had little 
concern for social equality, as Atkinson noted, “the harshest condemnation of the colored 
men I ever heard has come from northern men.”25 
 Having helped secure Atlanta as the location for the International Cotton 
Exposition, Grady understood this need, and, as arguably the most avid proponent of the 
exposition, he recognized that not only was southern cotton practice on display, but that 
Atlanta would be placed under scrutiny as a stand-in for the entirety of the South.  And so 
special attention was paid to highlight black southerners’ involvement, as with an exhibit 
from the American protectorate, the Republic of Liberia, to which the Exposition’s 
director, H.I. Kimball awarded a certificate of merit “for interesting and constructive 
collective exhibit.”26  The press also covered blacks’ attendance of the exposition, noting 
when they would come “out in force,” particularly in December 1881 on “Freedman’s 
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Day” to examine the machinery and hear speeches touting the advancement of the colored 
people in the South.  W.A. Pledger, the black editor of the Journal of Progress, extended 
high praise: 
 
I regret that more of my own race are not present to hear and learn.  I can 
say that we present to the world a spectacle that is seldom seen—a race 
lifted from servitude and placed side by side in the race of life with the ex-
master…and with the jealousies removed; so that we feel at home in these 
southern lands and amongst friends.27 
 
 The exposition’s promoters deemed it a success, as it drew in roughly 290,000 
attendees and likely spurred the impetus for the establishment of a number of factories in 
Atlanta, from companies such as Southern Agricultural Works and Chattahoochee Brick 
Company.  But most importantly, through Grady’s publicity, it secured the eyes of some 
three hundred writers from the northern presses.28  The New York-based Century 
Illustrated Magazine wrote of the profound changes of southern attitudes, “In general, it 
may be said that the New South is surely surmounting the intense and dogmatic 
provincialism of the Old, and is rapidly coming into line with the more progressive States.”  
Much to the surprise of the writer, the South offered blacks “ample suburbs…[that] mark 
the capacity of the negro to establish himself in comfort” and that “order and safety for 
white and black alike are now well assured throughout the South.”  But perhaps most 
importantly, the writer vindicated the South of many of its past transgressions, noting that 
the “dreaded negroes not only were suddenly enfranchised, but that the greater part of the 
white citizens of the Southern States were, at the same time, disenfranchised,” and that a 
new generation of leaders had since emerged.  He then asked, “may it not be well for 
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Northern men to see if they also have not been controlled by some errors in regard to the 
past history and condition of the South?”29  It was a sentiment echoed by countless other 
papers, including the New York Times, the Cincinnati Inquirer, the Washington Post, and 
the Detroit Free Press.30   
 To many in the North, the South had developed to a point to provide its black 
citizens with a not unreasonable place to settle, to work, and to raise a family.  Southern 
newspapers maintained that blacks needed only little to subsist on, that they were content 
to move between odd jobs and perform at slow speeds, per their “idle” temperament.31  
Northern newspapers picked up on this propaganda and publicized the working conditions 
in the fields of the South.  One writer for the Detroit Free Press reported that blacks 
enjoyed a working environment unparalleled in any other part of the country, and worked 
for employers who were receptive and tolerant of their workers’ needs.32  Blacks too had 
every opportunity to advance themselves in this changed South.  In Georgia, Senator 
Joseph Brown demonstrated his commitment to educating blacks.  Speaking to Grady 
through the New York Herald, he affirmed the integral role blacks played in southern 
society, “But we want these people educated so that they can vote intelligently and 
honestly, and prevent them being defrauded…Knowledge will protect them as armies nor 
laws nor anything else ever can…”33  And to provide an outside, ‘unbiased’ opinion to its 
readership, the Constitution made a point to publish the statements of Professor Alan Curr, 
native of Scotland, an extensive traveller and member of several British aristocratic 
                                                 
29 Edward Atkinson, “Significant Aspects of the Atlanta Cotton Exposition,” Century Illustrated Magazine 
23, no. 4 (1882): 565-7. 
30 “A New Era for the South,” New York Times, October 13, 1881.; “The Atlanta Exposition,” Cincinnati 
Inquirer, January 2, 1882.; “The Atlanta Cotton Exposition,” Washington Post, November 8, 1881.; 
“Atlanta,” Detroit Free Press, September 2, 1881.  
31 “How the Darkies Live,” Constitution, October 26, 1877. 
32 “Glimpses of the South,” Detroit Free Press, August 9, 1881. 
33 Henry W. Grady, “The South as She Is,” New York Herald, January 1, 1881.  
74  
societies, who attested to the superior treatment blacks received in the South, that the 
“negro…gets much better treatment than he deserves.”34   
 But in reality, the International Cotton Exposition had little place for the inclusion 
of southern blacks.35  And Georgia politicians thought little of educating blacks, 
undercutting and underfunding black schools.36  It was enough to demonstrate the potential 
profits to be made in the South, that capitalism would drive southern development, and that 
racial tension had apparently subsided, having given way to a lasting peace.37  By 1884, 
many northerners embraced the South’s reformed image concerning its disposition towards 
blacks.  By this indication in particular, the South had moved past its Confederate rebel 
days, and had embraced northern values of industriousness, progress, and unity, at least to 
the desired extent; in other words, the New South had already come, waiting for 
northerners to embrace it.38  Northerners were chiefly concerned with economics and 
profits—the apparent handling of racial tension meant namely that northerners were 
welcome in this previously hostile land.  Now many of these northern businessmen, 
investors, entrepreneurs, and laborers could conduct their business without issue.  
 
The New England Society Revisited  
 Though Grady had succeeded in changing northern views of the South, his southern 
compatriots remained apprehensive; they feared that the inevitable influx of northern 
capital and immigrants would fundamentally alter the South, molding it into the image of 
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the North to such an extent that southern tradition and identity would be wiped out 
altogether.  Such was the obvious fear during Reconstruction, of complete Yankeefication, 
that would continue to fuel the beginnings of the Lost Cause narrative, which countered 
and undermined the prospect of a Yankeefied South by strengthening the image of a 
romanticized South.39  When, in 1870 and 1871, former Know Nothing and Representative 
from Georgia Benjamin H. Hill had suddenly called for his state to emulate the economic 
practices of the North and to “do all in our power to educate, elevate, protect, and advance 
the negro,” when he blamed slavery for southern inferiority and the Confederate defeat and 
encouraged the recognition of the Reconstruction Amendments, he was met with disdain 
from the Georgia traditionalists and was ostracized for several years.40  Hill had spoken too 
strongly and too soon following the end of the war, but Grady, an admirer of his, in 
following the political discourse of the early 1870s, had learned well from these mistakes.  
Hill, despite his protestations to the contrary, implied that the South would lose its 
independence in regulating and organizing its society, namely regarding the place of blacks 
in that society.  Grady, by contrast, ensured southern individuality, that the South, though it 
had moved beyond the days of the Civil War, remained in control of instituting and 
perpetuating its own values, its own morals, and its own infrastructure.    
 Such was his purpose when he addressed the New England Society at Delmonico’s 
Restaurant in New York City in 1886 about the New South.  His opening words, “There 
was a South of slavery and secession—that South is dead.  There is a South of union and 
freedom—that South, thank God, is living, breathing, growing every hour,” distinguished 
between old and new, but later he remarked “the South has nothing for which to 
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apologize…The South has nothing to take back.”   He spoke of brave soldiers, perhaps 
misguided but beautiful all the same, of hard work, of a glorious past:  
 
Dear to me, sir, is the home of my childhood and the traditions of my 
people.  I would not, if I could, dim the glory they won in peace and war, or 
by word or deed take aught from the splendor and grace of their 
civilization—never equaled and, perhaps, never to be equaled in its 
chivalric strength and grace.41 
 
These words—traditions, chivalric, splendor—were key components of the emerging Lost 
Cause that defined southern identity as having a rich history and of honor, even in the 
Confederacy’s defeat.  Grady fed his New South vision, imbued with sentimentality for a 
bygone era, to these northern leaders and businessmen, and they embraced it.  Grady then 
offered a few general words on blacks in the South, “no section shows a more prosperous 
laboring population than the negroes of the South.”  Blacks were protected by the law, they 
could vote, work, and live in “friendship” with whites.  And then he subtly expressed his 
purpose, “To liberty and enfranchisement is as far as law can carry the negro.  The rest 
must be left to conscience and common sense.  It should be left to those among whom his 
lot is cast, with whom he is indissolubly connected…”42  In other words, the question of 
race belonged to the (white) South and the (white) South alone to decide, without 
interference from the North.  Grady closed his speech by asking his audience if it would 
accept comradeship, and the terms it necessitated, or coldness.  The crowd delivered a 
lengthy standing ovation.43    
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 Northern and Republican newspapers across the country printed their laudatory 
comments of Grady and his speech.  The speech was, after all, exactly what northerners 
wanted to hear, and what Grady had been essentially saying since he began touting the 
International Cotton Exposition.  His speech relieved any lingering doubts about the South, 
and at last these businessmen could embrace the South in reconciliation.  Naturally that 
meant accepting Grady’s few, fleeting words on race, which Republicans did.  Historian 
Barton C. Shaw calls Grady’s remarks on southern race relations a “bald deception,” but 
Grady said little less than he had been saying for several years.44  That was ultimately the 
point of his New South, to tell the Republicans just enough to let bygones be bygones, so 
that Grady and the other New South leaders could go about instituting a policy of race that 
fit the widely held southern notion of white supremacy.  In yielding to the South on the 
issue of race in favor of economic prospects, Republicans in the end doomed southern 
blacks to wither under an oppressive system. 
 
“Equal but Separate” and the Alliance Lost  
 That Grady believed in white supremacy is certain from the historical record.  He 
grew up in a home with at least five slaves, and later in life he wrote fondly of his boyhood 
days and his family’s “trusty” slaves.45  He believed that slavery had put the Negro in his 
proper place; he spoke of plantation life fondly, insisting that blacks had enjoyed a life of 
boundless fulfillment, “a happiness and contentment to which the servants of New England 
were utter strangers, and which we fear the negro will never know again.”46 But though it 
provided a public good in fixing a place for the South’s black population, slavery did not 
                                                 
44 Shaw, “Henry Grady Heralds The New South,” 57. 
45 Nixon, 21, 34, 39. 
46 Henry W. Grady, “The Stage,” Constitution, January 12, 1881. 
78  
coalesce with his New South vision.  At the height of Reconstruction, Benjamin H. Hill 
had blamed the institution of slavery for entrenching the South in an unproductive 
economic system that was far inferior to that of the North, and, for that reason, the South 
had lost the Civil War. Grady, too, hailed the end of slavery; it was outdated, outmoded, 
and held back the South from achieving its full potential.  He thanked “the higher wisdom 
of God” for having brought about its end.47  
 But he also believed that, without slavery, there was no place for blacks in modern 
society, and so whites would need to find a place for them, a place where they could do the 
least harm and so maintain the social order.  He insisted upon their lesser intelligence and 
their incredulousness; they were, he believed, easily manipulated, misguided, and 
impulsive, and therefore posed a danger to themselves and society.  But that view did not 
call for hostility between the races, and, when he needed to, Grady associated with blacks 
cordially.  Those blacks who met him found him most friendly, and one T. McCants 
Stewart, a black newspaperman from Boston who travelled to the South as a correspondent 
of the New York Freeman to document his experiences with the racially tense South, 
wrote regarding his railroad travels, “Mr. Grady would be compelled to ride with a Negro, 
or, walk.”48  But the best solution, the one Grady called for in the New South, was to very 
simply mingle as little as possible—to remain separate.  
 The race question had burned in society for years, but Grady did not fully engage 
with it until 1883.  The Civil Rights Cases of that year had declared the Civil Rights Act of 
1875 unconstitutional on the grounds that though Congress possessed the power to prohibit 
states from discriminating, it did not possess the broad powers to prohibit individuals from 
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discriminating, with the court ruling, “It would be running the slavery argument into the 
ground to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make 
as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take in his coach or cab or 
car…”49  When Republican Senator George F. Edmunds, a vocal proponent of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875, drafted a revised bill to replace the repealed act a month after the 
Supreme Court’s decision, the  Constitution attacked him, claiming that Edmunds was 
engaging in “bloody-shirt business” and that any bill that regulated social interaction was 
inherently unconstitutional, “Cases can arise only when certain so-called social rights are 
denied, and as everybody knows, social distinctions cannot be erased by the law.”50  Where 
Frederick Douglass feared that justice for blacks had been deteriorating “the hour that the 
loyal North…began to shake hands over the bloody chasm,”51 Grady offered words of 
approval, affirming that the Civil Rights Act had been “for nine years…practically a dead 
letter.”  This matter of “where to draw the [color] line” had been settled for years by the 
very nature of blacks and whites, “The truth is, the negro does not want social equality.  He 
prefers his own schools, his own churches, his own hotels, his own societies…He is 
uncomfortable and ill at ease when he is forced anywhere else.  Even on the railroads he 
prefers his own car…” But this separation did not discredit blacks from justice or the vote, 
noted Grady, as “The negro is entitled to his freedom, his franchise, his full and equal 
rights…This he ought to have and he must have.  Social equality he can never have.  He 
does not have it in the north, or in the east, or in the west.”52 At last Grady had revealed the 
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heart of the New South: a racially segregated society, but one, he assured, that both races 
desired and needed to ensure a peaceful, successful society. 
   But if Grady could assuage his critics in 1883, he met a challenge in George W. 
Cable in 1885.  Writing as the son of slaveholders and a resident of New Orleans, Cable 
wrote a prodding though less-than inflammatory article in Century Illustrated Magazine 
calling for the South to forsake its “antagonistic sentiments” towards its black citizens and 
abandon its system “of vicious evasions eventually ruinous to public and private morals 
and liberty…”  Indeed Cable found the rhetoric of Grady’s New South disingenuous, and 
that its promises of prosperity and material development mattered little when it relied upon 
the debasement of blacks to a lower public standing.  In a later article in Century, he asked 
of Grady regarding his New South, “could any one more distinctly or unconsciously waive 
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the whole question of right and wrong?  Yet this is the standpoint on which it is proposed 
to meet the freedman’s case in equity.”53   
 Grady responded forcefully to defend himself and his vision.  He first wrote in the 
Constitution that Cable was a poor representative of the South with “no real right to speak 
for the south.  He is entirely out of sympathy with the great body of our people.  He 
confesses this himself.”  Grady maintained that Cable sought to misguide the American 
people as to the South’s intentions, “In brief, Mr. Cable holds that the races should be 
mixed in schools, theaters, cars, and churches.  The Constitution holds that there should be 
equal accommodations for the two races, but separate.  That is just the difference between 
us.”  And he took his assertions further by arguing that the South’s separating the races 
occurred naturally, even in the North: 
 
Let us suppose that Springfield, Mass. has only one theater, and that half its 
population are negroes, would the white people of that city go to the theater 
with the knowledge that night after night half the audience would be 
negroes, indiscriminately placed?  There is not, in our opinion, a city in 
America where that sort of thing could be continued for a season.  One race 
or the other would gradually draw off.54 
 
He vehemently stood by “separate but equal” and assured readers that any accommodation 
that did not meet the measure of equality for both races was “…wrong, and will be 
remedied.”55  Seven days later, Grady called Cable a sentimentalist that ignored facts—that 
it was the Republicans that instigated the problem when they forced intermingling of the 
races during Reconstruction, that it was blacks who “are the readiest to draw the race and 
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color-line, and every movement they make is away from Mr. Cable’s propositions,” and 
that it was no man’s place but the Negro’s to “…build himself up.  His success or his 
failure depends on himself alone.”56  And five days after that, Grady contended that Cable 
had misrepresented the facts of situations of white-on-black malice he had cited in his 
article, noting that Cable’s story of a black Alabama preacher who had been whipped for 
attempting to “force his way into the ladies’ coach” had been whipped by a “posse of 
northern drummers [that] did not represent the purposes and desires of the southern 
people.”  And his attacks became personal, “Moreover, Mr. Cable does not sing his little 
Creole lays for honor, but for money.”57  The white southern press followed Grady in kind, 
attacking Cable’s ideas; the Constitution reprinted a snippet from Cable’s native New 
Orleans Picayune that affirmed its support of equal accommodations and that “we cannot 
advocate the degradation of the white race for the sake of the questionable elevation of the 
black.”58   
 Grady could be more forceful and direct for his primarily southern audience, but he 
needed a more coaxing tongue when addressing the northern Republican audiences.  He 
penned an article in Century Illustrated Magazine four months following Cable’s article.  
Making the same points but with milder language, Grady rejected racial equality, declaring 
that separate but equal was wise, best, and desired by both races alike, and, most 
importantly, that the question of race in the South was a distinctly southern issue, not 
meant to be tampered with by outside sources and critics, “…[the South] accepts the issue 
without fear or evasion.  She says… conscious of the honesty and the wisdom of her 
convictions: ‘Leave this problem to my working out.  I will solve it in calmness and 
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deliberation, without passion or prejudice…Judge me rigidly, but judge me by my 
works.’”59 
 At its absolutely most basic, these articles and exchanges essentially made up 
Grady’s New South speech to the New England Society, but it also becomes readily 
apparent just how much information Grady had left out of his address regarding the race 
question and how the South sought to handle it.  Grady’s New South as a whole, in fact, 
rested upon the laurels of racial superiority—a New South meant industrialization and 
economic gain but never at the expense of white supremacy.  Of course Grady could not 
outright speak his mind; the North was, after all, a predominantly Republican domain that 
depended on the black vote, and he could not risk outright alienating these northern 
audiences.  But it becomes clear in this period between 1883 and 1885, between articles 
intended for southern audiences and others intended for northern audiences, that Grady 
meant for the New South to be a white South. 
 By 1887 this stance was well known.  Grady wrote less and spent more time 
travelling the country to give speeches to northern and southern audiences alike.  The 
speeches did not deviate from his previous writings and, in some cases, were even more 
blunt.  To a Texas audience in 1887, Grady very directly reiterated his opinions, “Those 
who would put the negro race in supremacy would work against infallible decree, for the 
white race can never submit to its domination because the white race is the superior race.  
But the supremacy of the white race of the South must be maintained forever…This is… 
no new truth.”60  This talk drew enthusiasm from the Texas crowd, but it had begun to lose 
sway over northern audiences.  Violence in the South against blacks became more apparent 
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with the increased prevalence of incidents of lynching through the years and the Carrollton 
Court House Massacre still fresh in the mind.61  But Grady and the Constitution remained 
silent on most lynching, occasionally offering a half-hearted denunciation of vigilante 
justice.62  Racially driven violence directly countered Grady’s claims that tension in the 
South had subsided and blacks and whites lived together harmoniously.  Meanwhile claims 
of election tampering in the South in preventing the black vote to maintain Democratic 
control increased.  In 1889, with a Republican government in control of the White House 
and slight majorities in both houses of the legislature, the Congress debated the Lodge Bill 
(or the Force Bill as it was known to its detractors), which would allow the federal (i.e. 
Republican) government to appoint supervisors to ensure elections proceeded fairly.  Met 
with reproach by Grady and other southern leaders, it led to President Harrison’s extending 
an invitation to Grady to address the Boston Merchants Association in December 1889 
about the race question.  In his speech he once again raised many of his same points: 
inferior black intelligence, inherent white superiority, noble Confederates, an unwavering 
history, etc.  And when asked by President Harrison when blacks would “cast a free 
ballot?” Grady responded, “When ignorance anywhere is not dominated by the will of the 
intelligent; when the laborer anywhere casts a vote unhindered by his boss; when the vote 
of the poor anywhere is not influenced by the power of the rich…then will the ballot of the 
negro be free.”63  But more than anything he urged patience from Republicans, “We simply 
report progress and ask your patience.  If the problem be solved at all—and I firmly 
believe it will, though nowhere else has it been—it will be solved by the people most 
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deeply bound in interest…”64  It becomes clear that, by this point, Grady really offered no 
solutions to the issue.  He asked for time and self-determination, and for years his words 
were enough to coax those requests out of his audience.  His Boston speech was met with 
mild, respectful approval from the white press and outright indignation from the black 
press.65   
 But the exact words spoken mattered little, for, having been ailing for several 
weeks prior to the speech, Grady died on December 23, 1889, less than two weeks after 
delivering his address.  Newspapers and prominent figures mourned his death, calling him 
“an Apostle of the new faith,” “a model citizen,” “a loyal unionist,” and “the best 
representative of the New South,” among other laudatory citations.66  The papers 
conclusively claimed, “At the South he represented the new pride in the material revival of 
a section desolated by the war.  At the North he stood for loyal and enthusiastic support by 
the South of the new claims of the Union,” and that he possessed “a moral courage 
Northern men can little understand” in opposing “Southern treatment of the negro.”67  One 
newspaper stated that his speech to the Boston Merchants Association now stood as “one 
of those rare addresses that carry with them an immediate broadening of the views of every 
auditor.”68  In short, they felt they had lost a noble son of the South whose work was not 
yet finished. 
 But if his final speeches give any indication, Grady had little left to offer the South 
or the Union as a whole.  He was repeating the same words, asking for the same tokens 
from a Republican-controlled North that, while open to his words, desired control of the 
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country through the black vote more than unrecognized assurances of racial unity. And 
from the South he asked for toleration in a society that began more and more to see the 
brutalization of blacks as not only acceptable but necessary.69  When Democratic and 
Republican interests became too disparate, the political alliance between the two collapsed. 
 And in that collapse, history shows, the New South served as a stepping-stone that 
launched the South into the era of Jim Crow.  And Grady had clearly help to establish it: he 
had advocated for social segregation for years and his rhetoric preceded that of Plessy v 
Ferguson’s “Separate but Equal” ruling by more than a decade.  Though he did not 
advocate violence against blacks, he did not condemn it often or particularly harshly.  
Grady failed to realize that his New South rested so heavily on the Lost Cause and a 
glorious past—a past in which whites were always smarter, nobler, braver, and more 
human than blacks—that white racial pride ultimately turned to violence.  And because he 
instilled in his southern white Democratic audience an identity so strongly based on those 
violence-fueling tenets, the harmonious, separate but equal society that he dreamt of could 
never stand—eventually, he was going to push away either the Democrats or the 
Republicans.    
 But it did have a chance, however brief it was.  For at least part of the decade, 
Grady had held together fairly well the many influences and factors affecting his New 
South vision.  With the rhetoric resembling the Lost Cause, Grady had united a southern 
Democratic society demoralized after the Civil War and Reconstruction.  His defense of 
southern history and values, its racial heritage and superiority among them, instilled in his 
southern audiences a new drive for an almost moral victory in their defeat.  And he 
convinced his Republican audiences of that new identity by demonstrating the general 
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awareness in the South of its past faults, including those related to race, “She [the South] 
knows that every mistake made and every error fallen into, no matter how innocently, 
endangers her peace and her reputation.”70  This cognizance of the South’s past and the 
words promising a dedication to a changed future, coupled with the economic benefits of 
investment, offered Republicans just enough to let southerners handle the race question 
without the intervention of the federal government.  On these lines a political alliance was 
formed between Democrat and Republican: a sectional reconciliation that left the 
Democratic South free to its own devices in settling its issues of race.  Through that 
alliance, Republicans received the wealth they had wanted, beginning the wider scale 
transformation of the agrarian South.  Meanwhile, Democratic whites began instituting 
their separate but equal society; all had received what they had desired.  But as Democrats 
turned to increased violence in asserting their racial pride, Republicans responded with 
measures to protect their voters.  The political alliance could not withstand the tension 
between these partisan forces, and with it, so died Grady and his New South.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
 In the years following Grady’s death, Democrats maintained full control of the 
South and undid the civil rights gains of the Reconstruction era.  The introduction of the 
Lodge Bill in 1889 marked the beginning of several years of political disorder in the 
struggle for power between Democrats and Republicans.  An effort to restore both black 
and white Republican voting rights in the South, the Lodge Bill would have extended 
federal supervision of national elections to combat voter fraud and disenfranchisement 
tactics in the South.  Republicans viewed it as a mild reform, and some thought excessively 
so, but one that would hopefully lead to stronger measures down the road.  But southern 
Democrats viewed it as a Force Bill, a callback to the days of Reconstruction.  It was 
defeated in the Senate after senators with constituents in the silver mining industry 
defected to the Democrats in exchange for Democratic aid on measures regarding silver.  
Democrats mobilized in opposition to the bill the following year to claim a majority in 
Congress in 1890.  In the subsequent years, Democrats repealed the Enforcement Acts of 
1870-71, which had protected black civil rights in the South.  The depression of the 1890s, 
concurrent with the string of Democratic victories in Congress, led Republicans to drop 
voter rights from their national platform by the middle of the decade, instead focusing on 
the economic issues plaguing the northern constituency.  The rise of the Populist Party 
influenced the Democratic Party to adopt Populist stances against the trusts, the railroads, 
and other corporate interests, pitting Democrats and Republicans against each other on a 
new front.  Though there was risk that Republicans would again turn to civil rights issues 
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in the South, the Democrats had outmaneuvered the Republicans and won the freedom to 
restrict the franchise in the South, and the era of Jim Crow moved into full swing.1    
 Unsurprisingly, this was not the exact future that Grady had imagined in his New 
South, but his vision of a fully industrialized and racially separated South certainly played 
a role in shaping this future.  From the very beginning, Grady built his idea of a New South 
upon the past of the Old South that appealed to the white supremacist views of southern 
Democrats.  Grady remembered an Old South that was peaceable, civilized, and genteel, 
where whites lived in harmony with blacks because slavery kept them in their place, and 
slaves in turn respected and honored their masters.  In solidifying this imagining of the Old 
South, Grady helped unite southern whites within an identity as ‘southerners’ with a proud 
history tied to racial superiority.  For some southern Democrats, creating a society with 
racially separate spaces may have been enough to maintain the racial hierarchy.  But for 
others, separation was not enough: many whites feared an erosion of their racial position.  
Violence and intimidation, therefore, were the best mechanisms to dominate southern 
blacks and thereby uphold the white South.2    
 To Republicans, separate but equal was not an unreasonable trade for the economic 
promises of Grady’s New South.  The South, it preached, was a land of untapped 
resources, its full utilization hindered by slavery.  The South had changed since 
Reconstruction—southerners had laid their grudges to rest, had embraced the goal of 
industrialization, and as a result had created a harmonious society where blacks and whites 
each worked for their own prosperity.  The profits, many believed, would be enormous.  
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That assurance was too enticing to ignore, and if Republicans had lingering doubts about 
the safety of Republican immigrants and voters, Grady had mollified their anxieties with 
his convincing stories of a changed South.  His vision told of a South in which blacks and 
whites interacted cordially when they needed to, but otherwise left each to his own 
devices; this was best for a mixed race society, he argued, and was desired by both races.  
To Republicans, a society equal but separate would be acceptable so long as it did not lead 
to election tampering and voter interference.  But violence and intimidation against black, 
Republican voters increased as the decade progressed.  These practices, compounded with 
the passage of an increasing number of restrictive voting measures by state governments, 
the poll tax and education qualification among them, frustrated Republicans despite their 
economic interests.3   
 By the end of the 1880s, Republicans openly expressed their dissatisfaction with 
Grady’s New South solution to the race issue, and southern Democrats grew only more 
hostile in their pursuit of an answer to it.  In his final address, Grady asked for patience, 
assuring his audience that the South would reach an acceptable resolution, but by then his 
vision, the political alliance it had secured, and soon he himself, were dead. 
 But though the vision itself broke down, many of its elements were in the end 
fulfilled.  Considerable northern capital steadily flowed into the South for years following 
Grady’s death.  In particular, the southern textile industry maintained the potent growth 
that began in 1881 and contributed to the collapse of the New England textile industry in 
the 1920s.  Democrats retained the reins of power until the 1960s by forming the Solid 
South voting bloc.  Such security allowed southern Democrats to maintain a legal system 
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of racial segregation for over 70 years until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
And though the early years of the 1890s saw tension between Democrats and Republicans, 
the prospect of war with Spain united the nation.  In 1898, with the first American casualty 
of the Spanish-American War, sailor Worth Bagley of North Carolina, the Atlanta 
Constitution declared that his was the blood that formed “the covenant of brotherhood 
between north and south.”4 
 Indeed North and South and Democrat and Republican ultimately achieved the 
reconciliation for which Grady had fought.  But reconciliation was never guaranteed to 
arrive.  In fact this study of Grady’s New South vision reveals the degree of the political 
flux that dominated the 1880s.  This flux offers further proof that the decade was very 
much locked in political and racial uncertainty regarding the future.  And that so many 
latched onto Grady’s New South vision within this uncertainty demonstrates the vision’s 
mythic sway. 
 Mythic is an appropriate descriptor of Grady’s New South, for it ultimately 
described a story: a version of the southern past, constructed out of a longing for victory in 
the face of defeat, that raised white southerners from the mud of conquest and into the 
sunshine of a bright future.  For these white southerners, politics, race, and history all met 
at the nexus of identity—though a white southerner may be poor, though he may struggle 
from day to day, he was still white, he was still a Democrat, and he was still a southerner, 
and in that he could take pride.  From Grady’s New South, then, we can better see how this 
interim period between Reconstruction and Jim Crow birthed this renewed sense of 
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identity, and how it marked the shift toward the racial attitudes that would dominate the 
first half of the 20th century.   
 C. Vann Woodward refers to the South as suffering from a series of “illusions of 
permanency,” that each new southern system, be it the various antebellum, post-
Reconstruction, or Jim Crow systems, is thought to be the final system.  More than any 
other region of the United States, the South has proven the most inconstant.  Even today, 
the modern South bears more resemblance to George W. Cable’s No South than ever 
before, and yet it remains distinctly southern.  Henry Grady and his vision serve this 
narrative of change and negotiation between regions and parties, but also between people 
and their needs for self-actualization.  Northerners and southerners alike so embraced 
Grady’s vision because they needed its tenets: its prosperity and its racial accord.  But 
rather than view the vision and its various results as positive or negative, beneficial or 
harmful, I suggest we view it through this lens of change.  For though Henry Grady’s New 
South rose from the shadows of an ignoble memory, it gave way to something new, which 
in turn gave way to yet another system.  The modern South rests upon the foundations of 
these many South’s before it, and it too will one day fall to yield something new.5 
  
 
 
                                                 
5 C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), 8. 
93 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
Newspaper Clippings from Archival/Manuscript Collections 
 
Box 1 and Box 4, Bound Volumes 1-10, Henry Woodfin Grady papers, Manuscript, 
Archives and Rare Books Library, Emory University, Atlanta, GA.   
 
 
Government Documents 
 
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 
 
Newspapers  
 
Constitution; 1877-1885 
Chicago Tribune; 1880-1886 
Cincinnati Inquirer; 1880-1886 
Detroit Free Press; 1880-1882 
New York Times; 1876-1886 
Washington Post; 1880-1882 
 
 
Printed Primary Sources 
 
Atkinson, Edward. “Significant Aspects of the Atlanta Cotton Exposition.” Century 
Illustrated Magazine (1882): 563-574. 
 
“Atlanta to Liberia,” Friends’ Review; a Religious, Literary and Miscellaneous Journal 
35, no. 31 (1882): 493. 
 
Cable, George W. “The Freedman’s Case in Equity.” Century Illustrated Magazine (1885): 
409-418. 
 
Cable, George W. “The Silent South.” Century Illustrated Magazine 30, no. 5 (1885): 674-
692. 
 
Grady, Henry W. “In Plain Black and White: A Reply to Mr. Cable.” Century Illustrated 
Magazine 29, no. 6 (1885): 909-917. 
 
Pollard, Edward Alfred. The lost cause regained. New York: GW Carleton & Company, 
1868. 
 
 
94  
Secondary Sources 
 
Abbot, Richard H. For Free Press and Equal Rights: Republican Newspapers in the 
Reconstruction South. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2004. 
 
Abbot, Richard, H. “The Republican Party Press in Reconstruction Georgia, 1867-1874.” 
Journal of Southern History 61, no. 4 (1995): 725-760. 
 
Andrews, Mildred Gwin. The Men and the Mills: a history of the Southern textile industry. 
Macon, GA: Mercer Press, 1987. 
 
Bartley, Numan V. Creation of Modern Georgia. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 
1990. 
 
Banks, Louis Albert. T. DeWitt Talmage: his life and works: biographical edition. 
Philadelphia: John C. Winston Co., 1902. 
 
Blight, David W. Race and reunion: the Civil War in American memory. Cambridge: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001. 
 
Bonds, Russell S. War Like the Thunderbolt: The Battle and Burning of Atlanta. Yardley, 
PA: Westholme Publishing, 2009. 
 
Chalmers, David Mark. Hooded Americanism: the history of the Ku Klux Klan/ Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1987. 
 
Cobb, James C. Away Down South: A History of Southern Identity: A History of Southern 
Identity. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
 
Dailey, Jane Elizabeth. Before Jim Crow: The Politics of Race in Postemancipation 
Virginia. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 
 
Davis, Harold E. Henry Grady's New South: Atlanta, a Brave and Beautiful City. 
Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1990. 
 
Davis, Harold E. “Henry W. Grady, Master of the Atlanta Ring—1880-1886.” Georgia 
Historical Quarterly 69, no. 1 (1985): 1-38. 
 
Davis, Harold E. “Henry Grady, the Atlanta Constitution, and the Politics of Farming in 
the 1880s.” Georgia Historical Quarterly 71, no. 4 (1987): 571-600. 
 
Doyle, Don Harrison. New Men, New Cities, New South: Atlanta, Nashville, Charleston, 
Mobile, 1860-1910. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990.  
 
Duncan, Russel. “Rufus Bullock (1834-1907).” New Georgia Encyclopedia. April 27, 
2004. Accessed January 27, 2016. 
95  
http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/government-politics/rufus-bullock-
1834-1907. 
 
Eckert, Ralph E. “The Breath of Scandal: John B. Gordon, Henry W. Grady, and the 
Resignation-Appointment Controversy of May 1880.” Georgia Historical 
Quarterly 69, no. 3 (1985): 315-337. 
 
Gaston, Paul M. The New South Creed: a history in Southern mythmaking. New York: 
Knopf Press, 1970. 
 
Goldfield, David, R. Region, Race, and Cities: Interpreting the Urban South. Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997. 
 
Harris, Joel Chandler, ed. Joel Chandler Harris' Life of Henry W. Grady Including His 
Writings and Speeches: A Memorial Volume. New York: Cassell Publishing 
Company, 1890. 
 
Kousser, J. Morgan. The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the 
establishment of the One-Party System, 1880-1910. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1974. 
 
Nixon, Raymond B. Henry Grady: Spokesman of the New South. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1943. 
 
Prince, K. Stephen. Stories of the South: The cultural retreat from Reconstruction. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2010. 
 
Prince, K. Stephen. “A Rebel Yell for Yankee Doodle: Selling the New South at the 1881 
Atlanta International Cotton Exposition.” Georgia Historical Quarterly 92, no. 3 
(2008): 340-371. 
 
Reed, Wallace Putnam. History of Atlanta, Georgia: With Illustrations and Biographical 
Sketches of Some of Its Prominent Men and Pioneers. Syracuse, NY: D. Mason & 
co., 1889. 
 
Rabinowitz, Howard N. “More Than the Woodward Thesis: Assessing the Strange Career 
of Jim Crow.” Journal of American History 75, no. 3 (1988): 842-856. 
 
Russell, James Michael. “The ‘Phoenix City’ After the Civil War.” Atlanta History: A 
Journal of Georgia 33, no. 4 (1989): 18-28. 
 
Rutherford B. Hayes Presidential Center. “Disputed Election of 1876.” Accessed January 
29, 2016. http://www.rbhayes.org/hayes/president/display.asp?id=511. 
 
Shaw, Barton C. “Henry Grady Heralds the New South.” Atlanta Historical Journal 30, 
no. 2 (1986): 55-66. 
96  
 
Smith, John David, ed. When Did Southern Segregation Begin?. New York: Macmillan, 
2002. 
 
Smith, Mark M. “‘All Is Not Quiet in Our Hellish County’: Facts, Fiction, Politics, and 
Race: The Ellenton Riot of 1876.” South Carolina Historical Magazine 95, no. 2 
(1994), 142-155. 
 
Smith, W. Calvin. “The Reconstruction ‘triumph’ of Rufus B. Bullock.” Georgia 
Historical Quarterly 52, no. 4 (1968): 414-425. 
 
Woodward, C. Vann. The Strange Career of Jim Crow. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1955. 
 
Wright, Gavin. Old South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the 
Civil War. New York: Basic Books, 1986. 
 
Wright, Gavin. Slavery and American Economic Development. Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 2006. 
 
Venet, Wendy Hamond. A Changing Wind: Commerce and Conflict in Civil War Atlanta. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014. 
 
